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ABSTRACT
For much of its history, the Supreme Court applied a very strong presumption of constitutionality
in favor of federal statutes, striking them down only if convinced the statute was unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt. In more modern cases, however, the Court affords a much weaker
“presumption of constitutionality” that is closer to a mere tiebreaker, does not apply to all
constitutional challenges, and affords only factual, not interpretive deference. This Article argues
for adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of statutory passage, and
setting as the maximum the older, stronger beyond-rational-doubt presumption. Adjusting the
presumption based on the margin of passage addresses the concerns behind the
“countermajoritarian difficulty.” It is supported by the Constitution’s supermajoritarian
structures and theorists’ arguments about the superiority of supermajority enactments. It would
improve the Court’s legitimacy by making explicit and legitimate a basis of decision that has been
perceived to have influenced the Court’s decision making in key cases. It would also be more
objective than various theories advanced to allow the Court to accommodate popular will in
constitutional interpretation, and would be easier to implement than legislative proposals to “fix”
the countermajoritarian difficulty, because it can be implemented by the Court itself.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the presumption of constitutionality that
federal courts apply when reviewing federal statutes should strengthen based on the margin of passage in Congress, rising towards a
1
“Thayerian” maximum at which the Supreme Court would uphold a
statute unless it were proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt. Increasing deference based on the margin of passage would
further democratic and majoritarian values, reducing the muchdiscussed “countermajoritarian difficulty” caused by judicial review by
advancing the principle of respect for majority legislation that is one
of the main justifications for the presumption of constitutionality.
Deferring more to statutes that pass with more votes is also consistent
with the Constitution’s own supermajoritarian provisions and supported by academic theories about supermajorities’ and multimember legislatures’ superior ability to enact good laws and resolve
contested constitutional questions. Further, adjusting the presumption based on the margin of passage would improve popular perceptions of judicial legitimacy, both by making the Court more deferential to more popular laws and by explicitly acknowledging as a
legitimate basis of decision a factor widely perceived to have tacitly
influenced the Court’s decision making in important cases.
Part I explains the background of the “countermajoritarian difficulty” and of the presumption of statutory constitutionality rooted (at
least in part) in countermajoritarian concerns. It also introduces the
basic idea of an adjustable presumption of constitutionality tied to
the margin of statutory passage.
Part II gives arguments for the basic idea that the presumption of
constitutionality gets stronger with the margin of statutory passage.
Part III considers how an adjustable presumption of constitutionality
could work, arguing for a maximum Thayerian presumption requir1

James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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ing the Court to uphold a statute unless proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and including significant deference to Congress’s constitutional interpretation, and a minimum mere-tiebreaker
presumption without interpretive deference. Part III also considers
when the presumption would apply and in what types of cases it
might make the most difference. In particular, Part III limits the application of the proposal to those areas where the Court currently
applies a presumption of constitutionality, which excludes challenges
based on claimed violations of fundamental rights or claimed invidious discrimination against discrete minorities.
Part IV responds to potential objections, including arguments that
such an approach would be non-textual or unprecedented, problems
with ascertaining the margin of passage for federal statutes, and skepticism about the chances that the Supreme Court would embrace
such a rule. Part V concludes by discussing possible future areas of
inquiry.
I. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty
The countermajoritarian difficulty is very familiar—indeed, it is
generally acknowledged and sometimes bemoaned as the “central ob2
session” of constitutional scholarship over the past half-century. The
basic concern is that allowing unelected judges to overturn the acts of
elected legislatures frustrates democratic principles and the Constitu3
Alexander Bickel
tion’s preference for republican lawmaking.
coined the phrase “countermajoritarian difficulty” to describe this
4
problem. Since Bickel, legal theorists have debated extensively
whether there is really a problem and (if there is) about how it might
be solved, resolved, dissolved, or ameliorated.
2

3

4

See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road
to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (“The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1998) (“Contemporary
constitutional law is preoccupied with the antidemocratic nature of judicial review.”).
The following discussion attempts to briefly summarize the debates over the countermajoritarian difficulty, not comprehensively describe them.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–18 (1962); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2596 (2003) (“At bottom
it often seems to be a claim . . . that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based
upon constitutional requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of the citizenry.”).
See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 33.
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Theories of the difficulty, and related attacks on the principle of
judicial review, have taken several forms. These have included textual arguments that judicial review is illegitimate because it is not men5
tioned in the Constitution and originalist arguments that judicial review is illegitimate because it was not contemplated by the Framers or
ratifiers and deviates from the model of popular constitutionalism
6
that prevailed when and shortly after the Constitution was ratified.
Other critics have argued more modestly that even if judicial review is
theoretically legitimate, the Court has wrongly increased how often it
7
uses the power—from very rarely during its first century to much
more frequently today, especially since the 1960s and perhaps accel8
erating even further in the last two decades.
Beyond arguments that the Constitution does not (or did not
originally) authorize judicial review, countermajoritarian criticisms
also include philosophical arguments that judicial review is unjustifiable because it is procedurally illegitimate and not demonstratively
substantively superior to legislative deliberation as a way of resolving
9
contested issues about rights and constitutional interpretation.
5

6

7

8

9

E.g., Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 16 (1981) (“[T]he weight of evidence does not support the view that the
framers, who had taken the extraordinary step of adopting a [written] constitution as a
species of positive law, intended the judiciary to have such broad authority [of judicial review].”).
E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5,
5–6 (2001) (describing how the early Supreme Court took the modest position that its interpretations were not to be superior to the interpretations by the other branches and
demonstrating that the idea of judicial supremacy was not popular in the early nineteenth century).
The Court struck down only two federal statutes as unconstitutional before the Civil War.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432 (1856) (holding that the Missouri Compromise Act was unconstitutional); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138
(1803) (finding that a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional). For an
early academic expression of this concern, see Joseph L. Lewinson, Limiting Judicial Review
by Act of Congress, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 591, 591 (1935) (stating that the Court’s invalidation
of four federal statutes in 1934 was an unprecedented “mortality rate”). But see Keith E.
Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1257–58
(2009) (arguing that the standard story is wrong and that antebellum invalidation of federal statutes was actually more robust than generally thought).
See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule:
Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 74 (2003) (“This recent burst of decisions invalidating
federal statutory provisions [by the Rehnquist Court], particularly by bare-majority rule, is
historically anomalous.”).
See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 2–3(2007); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353 (2006) (“[Judicial review] is politically illegitimate, so far as democratic values are concerned: By privileging majority voting
among a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges, it disenfranchises ordi-
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Defenses of judicial review, or denials of the countermajoritarian
difficulty, have similarly taken several forms. Originalist criticisms
have been countered by scholars arguing that judicial review was in10
deed envisioned by the Framers from the beginning. Others have
argued there can be no countermajoritarian problem because the
Constitution’s structure (which was itself ratified by democratic pro11
cesses) specifically anticipates, or requires, judicial review. To the
extent that judicial review is undemocratic in the present, that is a
12
“feature, not a bug.” Beyond arguments based in the Constitution’s
text or history, others have justified the power because of its tendency
to protect important values—such as keeping the political process
open to all, safeguarding the fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution, or preserving federalism restrictions. They have suggested correspondingly that judicial review should be limited to or
13
heightened for challenges that implicate these values.
Outside the realm of theory, scholars have also argued that the
theoretical concern about countermajoritarianism is empirically invalid because the Court does, in fact, conform itself (perhaps with some

10

11

12

13

nary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights.”).
E.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
887, 892 (2003) (“[W]e believe that modern scholars who insist that the Founders never
authorized judicial review of federal statutes are mistaken.”); see also Thayer, supra note 1,
at 132–34 (tracing the evolution of judicial review in state constitutions prior to and just
after the Founding).
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1380 (1997) (arguing that the Constitution, and the mechanism
of judicial review, are designed “to remove a series of transcendent questions from shortterm majoritarian control”).
Cf. Mark Tushnet, Abolishing Judicial Review, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 581, 582 n.6 (2011)
(emphasizing that, under Tushnet’s proposal for abolishing judicial review, “the fact that
Congress might expressly authorize actions that courts exercising the power of judicial
review would find unconstitutional is a feature, not a bug”).
E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980) (arguing that judicial review’s proper role is correcting failures of democratic representation); Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1709 (2008) (“[T]he strongest case for judicial review . . . [is that] errors that result in the underenforcement of rights are more troubling than errors that result in their overenforcement, and judicial review may provide a distinctively valuable
hedge against errors of underenforcement . . . .”). Compare Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword:
Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 (2012) (criticizing the Roberts Court’s disdainful skepticism of the political process as particularly dangerous because it is combined with a narrow construction of key enumerated powers); with Steven G. Calabresi,
The Constitution and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 13, 14 (2012) (responding to Karlan
with an argument that judicial review in federalism cases is not countermajoritarian because the Court is merely umpiring between federal and state majorities).
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lag) to majority political preferences, and so actually is itself a demo14
cratic, majoritarian institution. Some have contended that judicial
review is not countermajoritarian because it is a “politically constructed” phenomenon assented to and encouraged by the elected branches of the government and, therefore, not meaningfully undemocrat15
ic. Others have argued that the antidemocratic concerns driving the
countermajoritarian difficulty are unfounded because Congress itself,
or the constitutional system more generally, distort and thwart actual
16
majoritarian policy preferences. Indeed, some argue that the Court
can even serve as an outlet to effect majority preferences thwarted by
countermajoritarian flaws in the representativeness of Congress or
17
inherent in the Constitution’s republican structure.
Among those who feel that the difficulty is real, theorists have
proposed a wide variety of solutions to solve, resolve, or dissolve the
difficulty. These often include proposals to limit the scope of judicial
14

15

16

17

See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court?
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 263–64 (2010) (suggesting
that Justices’ views generally track public opinion); Friedman, supra note 3, at 2606
(“[T]he wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of the time judicial decisions fall
within the range of acceptability that one might expect of the agents of popular government.”); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
87, 96 (1993) (finding that Supreme Court opinions track public preference with a 5–7
year time lag). But see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 117 (arguing that the modern majoritarian view of the
Court has been pushed to unrealistic and troubling extremes and that the Court has
stood dramatically, in some instances, against majoritarian views).
See generally, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(2007); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to
Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 363–64 (2008) (collecting
and summarizing literature on the challenges to the countermajoritarian perception of
the relationship between Justices and elected officials).
Scholars arguing that Congress is itself countermajoritarian focus on political polarization, defects in representation resulting from political gerrymandering, and problems
arising from the influence of special interests. See Graber, supra note 15, at 373–75 (describing countermajoritian problems with Congress and the President). Countermajoritarian critics of the constitutional structure focus on the Electoral College, the nonmajoritarian, federal structure of the Senate, and the onerous requirements for amending
the Constitution under Article V. E.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN
CORRECT IT) (2006) (describing both the theoretical and practical ramifications of the
Senate's disproportionate representation); Graber, supra note 15, at 376–79 (reviewing
arguments that American electoral institutions suffer from these and other countermajoritarian problems).
See Graber, supra note15, at 373 (“If . . . an off-center president is more conservative than
the general public and a malapportioned Senate is more liberal then [sic] the general
public, then courts may actually improve the democratic performance of governing institutions.”).
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review or to make it more difficult for courts to exercise that power to
18
overturn statutes. Some theorists argue for limiting or revising judicial review in a way favoring the theorist’s policy preferences by limit19
ing or increasing its application in certain substantive areas of law.
Others have made more neutral proposals for overall structural limitations on how the Supreme Court exercises the power—such as requiring more than a bare majority vote before the Court can overturn
a statute or allowing Congress, by supermajority vote, to override ju20
dicial invalidation of a statute. Theorists of reform have also made
21
more drastic proposals to abolish judicial review altogether. Of these proposals, however, none have been generally accepted as satisfactory by commentators, much less adopted by Congress or endorsed
by the courts. And, the prevailing view is that judicial review is suffi22
ciently well-entrenched that it is not going anywhere.
One reason for this is that the Court itself does not seem to share
any of the more radical concerns about the countermajoritarian

18

19

20

21

22

E.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 97–101 (examining a six-vote requirement for the Court
to invalidate a statute as a “corporate” mechanism of deference that could replace or
supplement the “atomistic” mechanism of Thayerian deference); see generally Maurice S.
Culp, A Survey of the Proposals to Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court
of the United States, 4 IND. L.J. 386 (1929) (collecting and categorizing examples of proposals to limit the Court’s judicial review authority up to 1929).
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 73 (considering supermajority requirements for the
Supreme Court’s invalidation of statutes as a response to the power of the “Federalism
Five,” a group of Justices particularly aggressive in their exercise of judicial review over
federal statutes challenged on federalism grounds); Fallon, supra note 13, at 1730–31 (arguing that judicial review should be limited in areas where there are conflicts between assertions of fundamental rights); see also Randy Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 HARV.
L. REV. F. 1, 11 (2012) (criticizing these approaches as “restraint for thee, but not for
me”).
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 117, 321 (1996) (arguing for a constitutional amendment allowing
Congress to override decisions of the Supreme Court); Caminker, supra note 8, at 78
(suggesting exploration of a congressional imposition of a supermajority rule on the
Court); Joseph L. Lewinson, Limiting Judicial Review by Act of Congress, 23 CALIF. L. REV.
591, 595–98 (1935) (considering whether Congress could take away the Court’s jurisdiction to declare laws unconstitutional); see generally Culp, supra note 18 (collecting various
proposals to limit the power of judicial review made during the first 140 years of the Nation’s history).
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154–76
(1999); Tushnet, supra note 12, at 581 (proposing a constitutional amendment to abolish
judicial review by forbidding courts from reviewing the constitutionality of any act of
Congress).
E.g., ETHAN LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 70 (2004) (“[J]udicial review is here to stay.”).
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problem potentially caused by judicial review.23 Since Marbury v. Mad24
ison, the Court itself has justified the practice as rooted in the
25
Court’s own duties and role under the Constitution. Moreover, the
modern trend is for the Court to be less deferential to elected legislatures, in terms of how frequently (and how ideologically) it invali26
dates statutes for unconstitutionality.
While the Court itself has not engaged in extensive theoretical
discussion about the countermajoritarian difficulty, it has frequently
acknowledged the dangers inherent in exercising its power to over27
turn the acts of elected legislators. And, the Court has developed a
variety of ways to limit its exercise of that power—including doctrines
28
like constitutional avoidance, jurisprudential approaches such as
29
“judicial minimalism,” and practices of selectivity in deciding which
30
Among these self-restraining doctrines is the precases to take.
sumption of constitutionality that the Court affords to federal stat31
utes. This presumption of constitutionality is the main focus of this
Article and is examined further in Part I.B.
At the same time, however, the Court also has expressed concerns
about bowing to political pressure when considering (and reconsidering) its decisions, and has indicated that altering its rulings based on

23

24
25

26

27
28

29

30

31

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519,
534–38 (2012) (arguing that there are no current Supreme Court Justices following a jurisprudential philosophy of strong deference to Congress).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
But see Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a
“Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2003) (noting that Marbury was not
commonly cited by the Court as authority for the power of judicial review prior to 1887).
See Caminker, supra note 8, at 84–85 (tracing the decline from very strong “Thayer” deference to something much less today); Posner, supra note 23, at 522–35 (describing the
popularity of Thayer’s theory of judicial restraint and the eventual end of the Thayerian
tradition). See also discussion infra Part I.B.
E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (“It is not our job
to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”).
See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2513 (2009) (describing how the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there
is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case).
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Commencement Address at Georgetown University Law
Center (May 21, 2006) (“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my
view it is necessary not to decide more.”).
See, e.g., H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 6 (1992) (noting the Court’s nearly complete power to set its own agenda).
See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 30 (1944) (Reed, J., dissenting) (“The presumption of constitutionality of statutes is a safeguard wisely conceived to keep courts within
constitutional bounds in the exercise of their extraordinary power of judicial review.”).
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such pressure would harm the Court’s legitimacy.32 And, as a practical matter, the Court’s enthusiasm for invalidating federal statutes as
unconstitutional does not seem to have diminished significantly in
33
recent years—if anything, it may have increased.
This Article accepts the twin premises that there is a countermajoritarian difficulty and that judicial review is so firmly entrenched in
the constitutional order that it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. This Article, therefore, does not seek to add to the extensive
debates over whether there actually is a countermajoritarian problem, but its argument for adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based on statutory margins is most likely to appeal to those who
think that there is. Specifically, this Article focuses on the argument
that if there is a countermajoritarian difficulty, it is more difficult
when the margin of statutory passage is larger. If judicial review is
questionable or illegitimate because it thwarts popular will, the
thwarting is worse, and more undemocratic, when a larger majority in
Congress supports the statute’s passage. This point is developed further in Part II.
This observation leads directly to this Article’s suggestion for a responsive adjustment to the doctrine: the Supreme Court should adjust the presumption of constitutionality that it applies to federal
statutes so that it is stronger for statutes passed by larger margins. Adjusting the presumption of constitutionality in this way would more
effectively limit the potential antidemocratic harms caused by the
Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review. In the next Subpart,
this Article summarizes the history, content, and contradictions of the
Supreme Court’s doctrine of the presumption of constitutionality for
federal statutes, as the second piece of background for the main argument.
32

33

E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey¸ 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[T]o overrule
under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”).
The Supreme Court declared 159 statutes unconstitutional, in whole or in part, between
1789 and 2002—about .75 per year overall, but about .02 per year pre-1865, and 1.14 per
year post-1865. See S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 2117–59 (2004) (listing and describing these
159 federal statutes held unconstitutional and the basis for their invalidation). Since
2002, the Court has declared an additional nine statutes unconstitutional, in whole or in
part—about one per term. See Thomas M. Keck, Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, MAXWELL SCH. OF SYRACUSE UNIV., http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/tmkeck/
Book_1/federal_statutes.htm (last updated June 27, 2013) (updating research on why
federal statutes have been struck down). See also Caminker, supra note 8, at 74 (noting
that from 1995 to 2002, the rate of Supreme Court invalidation of federal statutes increased significantly, as did the proportion of those decisions decided by a bare 5-4 majority).
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B. The Presumption of Constitutionality
The Supreme Court has long applied a presumption of constitutionality in favor of federal statutes, but the presumption has both
weakened and narrowed over time.
The presumption of constitutionality is often classified under the
broader heading of “judicial restraint,” together with other principles
like “judicial minimalism”—the idea that a court should decide cases
34
as narrowly as possible, in ways that are incompletely theorized —
and doctrines like “constitutional avoidance”—the rule that a court
should, when possible, avoid answering difficult constitutional ques35
tions by disposing of cases on non-constitutional grounds. As discussed above, these theories and doctrines are designed to restrain
the Court’s exercise of judicial review because of concerns about the
countermajoritarian dangers inherent in that power.
Since its early days, the Court has applied some sort of a presumption of constitutionality in favor of both federal and state statutes,
although the specific label “presumption of constitutionality” only
36
was applied later. At the most basic level, the presumption of constitutionality simply means that in evaluating the constitutionality of a
statute, the Court will afford some deference to the statute, and the
party challenging the statute will bear some burden of proof to show
its unconstitutionality.
The Court’s opinions, as well as academic explanations of the presumption of constitutionality, have justified it, at least in part, by the
37
principle of deferring to the will of legislative majorities. That is,
34
35

36

37

E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 9 (2001).
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1448 n.2 (2010) (grouping the presumption of constitutionality together with other restraining doctrines such as constitutional avoidance).
The first use of the specific phrase “presumption of constitutionality” was in In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 442 (1890), where it was used to describe the application of the presumption by a state court. The first use of the phrase by a Justice describing it as a doctrine of
the Court was in The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 575 (1914), where Justice McKenna referred to “the presumption of constitutionality to which all legislation is entitled . . . .”
The first case in which a majority of the Court used the specific phrase in actually applying the presumption is O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–
58 (1931)—but in doing so, it cited, in a footnote, cases stretching back to Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 475 (1883).
See, e.g., Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157 (1919) (“There is a
strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of
its own people . . . .”); Caminker, supra note 8, at 83–86 (describing three reasons for the
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the presumption has roots in the same concerns about unelected
judges invalidating elected legislatures’ enactments that animate the
38
perceived countermajoritarian difficulty. In addition, the Court and
theorists also justify the presumption on the grounds that Congress
has an independent duty to consider the Constitution when it legislates; that by passing a statute, Congress has presumptively concluded
that it is indeed constitutional; and that the Court should give some
39
deference to this conclusion. As explained further in Part II, both
of these justifications support adjusting the presumption of constitutionality so that it strengthens as the margin of statutory passage gets
larger.
While the justifications offered for the presumption of constitutionality seem to have remained fairly constant, the application of the
presumption has changed throughout the Court’s history—
weakening and narrowing in several significant ways.
First, the strength of the presumption has weakened. This weakening is suggested both by shifts in the language that the Court has
used to describe the presumption and by the significant modern increase in the rate at which the Court has invalidated federal statutes.
In earlier cases, the Court applied a very strong presumption, frequently framed as requiring that the invalidity of the statute be shown
40
beyond a reasonable or “rational” doubt or requiring a “clear show41
ing” of unconstitutionality. Until the early twentieth century, this

38
39

40

41

presumption given by Thayer himself, and four others given by scholars in more recent
work); Hessick, supra note 35, at 1469–72 (describing the “democratic accountability” rationale as one purpose of the presumption); Thayer, supra note 1, at 144, 151, 156.
The Court also presumes state statutes constitutional, but that presumption is beyond the
scope of this Article.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (justifying the presumption
based on Congress’s right and duty to “make its own informed judgment on the meaning
and force of the Constitution”).
See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878) (“Every possible presumption is in favor
of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt.”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 270 (1827) (“It is but a decent respect due to
the . . . legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until
its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.”); see also Hessick,
supra note 35, at 1457 n.48 (collecting examples of the Court employing the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard for constitutionality questions); Thayer, supra note 1, at 140–
49 (collecting early cases from the Supreme Court and state courts articulating and applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt version of the presumption).
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1871) (“A decent respect for a coordinate branch of the government demands that the judiciary should presume, until the
contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by Congress . . . .”); Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, supra note 6, at 79 (“Judicial review was . . . a
power to be employed cautiously, only where the unconstitutionality of a law was clear
beyond doubt . . . .”).
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very strong presumption of constitutionality was treated by the Court
as venerable and unquestionable: “This court, by an unbroken line
of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of
the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational
42
doubt.”
Over time, however, the Court has become less enthusiastic about
43
proclaiming that the presumption is strong, and appeals to the
strength of the presumption have become increasingly relegated to
44
dissenting opinions. The modern Court will occasionally describe
the presumption as requiring as much as a “plain showing that Con45
gress has exceeded its constitutional bounds,” but the “beyond rational doubt” formulation has disappeared. Moreover, at times, some
Justices on the modern Court seem to view the presumption as a
mere tiebreaker that will only prompt a vote to uphold the statute if
46
other considerations are in equipoise. In general, most agree that
the trend has been away from the strongest, Thayerian form of defer47
And, empirical assessments of trends in the
ence to Congress.

42
43

44

45
46

47

Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923).
For example, while there are nine majority decisions between 1931 and 1984 describing
the presumption of constitutionality afforded federal statutes as “strong,” see, for example, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976), as well as many earlier decisions applying the beyond-a-rational-doubt version, no majority decisions since 1984 mention a
“strong” presumption of constitutionality.
See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 267 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(wishing to uphold a statute’s constitutionality except in the “clear and urgent case”);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 327 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing a strong presumption of constitutionality); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 675 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Congressional enactments come to this Court with an extremely heavy presumption of validity.”); Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 93 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“This is so because of the very weighty presumption of constitutionality that I
deem is essential to attribute to any Act of Congress.”).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“What tips the
scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law. That
presumption gives the State the benefit of the doubt in close cases like this one, and on
that basis alone I concur in the Court’s judgment.”); see also Caminker, supra note 8, at
115 (“[In the Rehnquist court,] the boilerplate ‘presumption of constitutionality’ has apparently become a meaningless mantra.”).
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 86 (“[A] succinctly phrased ‘presumption of constitutionality’ is all today’s Congress gets [under modern doctrine].”); Timothy P. O’Neill,
Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the Affordable Care Act, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT
170, 177–80 (2012) (identifying the second Justice Harlan as the Court’s last practitioner
of full Thayerian deference); Posner, supra note 23, at 546 (“[Thayerism’s] judicial demise is attributable to the exuberant activism of the Warren Court . . . .”).
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Court’s invalidation of statutes (analyzing how frequently, and for
48
what reasons) seem to also support this view.
Second, the scope of application of the presumption has narrowed in two different ways. One is that the modern presumption
has become limited to questions of evidentiary support and does not
extend to questions of interpretation. Under the earlier, stronger
presumption doctrine, the Court applied a presumption of constitutionality in favor of the statute on both interpretive and fact ques49
tions. Now, however, the application of the presumption seems to
be largely limited to giving the statute the benefit of the doubt on
questions of constitutional fact-finding, with no interpretive defer50
ence.
Relatedly, the Court seems to have reduced the scope of the presumption of constitutionality by limiting the substantive areas of con51
stitutional law where it applies. This retraction and its extent are
more debatable or unclear. The Court does still sometimes assert
52
that the presumption of constitutionality applies in “all” cases.
48

49

50

51

52

As noted above, supra note 7, the Court invalidated only two federal statutes as unconstitutional between 1789 and 1865. Scholars have suggested that the pace and nature of invalidation accelerated significantly under the Warren Court. See Lee Epstein & William
M. Landes, Was There Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 557,
569–77 (2012) (finding that Justices appointed pre-1952 hesitated to strike down laws regardless of ideological agreement, while those appointed post-1952 have been opportunistic in their restraint); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737
(2012) (arguing, based on an empirical study, that the Roberts Court is not especially activist for the post-1969 era). But see Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 579, 599 (2012) (“[I]t may be that the true inception of judicial activism
was at the end of the Civil War, not the opening of the Civil Rights era.”).
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (requiring a “strong conviction of . . . incompatibility” between Constitution and law); Hessick, supra note 35, at 1457
n.48 (providing other examples).
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (“It is thus a ‘permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system’ that ‘the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution.” (internal citations omitted)); Hessick, supra note 35, at 1449.
See Caminker, supra note 8, at 85 (describing the Court’s division of the “constitutional
terrain” into areas of strong and weak deference, starting roughly with its decision in
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 442 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is
true as well, as the Court observes, that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to every Act of Congress.”); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (suggesting that all
acts of Congress are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality). Some suggest that
the Court does apply the presumption to all cases, in the basic sense of giving the challenger the burden of proof, but “how high” the burden is—i.e., how strong the presumption of constitutionality is—is “not consistent” between different types of constitutional
challenges, or even from case to case. See Orin Kerr, More on the Presumption of ConstituCONSPIRACY
(June
30,
2011
12:12
p.m.),
tionality,
VOLOKH
http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/30/more-on-the-presumption-of-constitutionality.
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However, these assertions seem to be made frequently in procedural
contexts, such as when the Court reverses lower court refusals to stay
injunctions of federal statutes on the theory that the presumption of
constitutionality tips the balance of harms towards staying the injunc53
tion pending appeal.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly and explicitly stated in the
mid-to-late-twentieth century that the presumption is weakened, is
lessened, or does not apply in many different contexts—including
challenges involving fundamental rights, separation-of-powers issues,
rights to political representation, and equal-protection challenges in54
volving the rights of minorities. Indeed, in certain contexts, such as
First Amendment challenges to content-based speech restrictions, the
Court has made clear that the presumption not only does not apply,
55
but is actually reversed. Thus, the uncontested or unqualified appli-

53

54

55

Others contend that the Court frequently simply does not apply the presumption at all.
See Ilya Somin, The Presumption of Constitutionality Revisited, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 30,
2011
1:06
p.m.),
http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/30/the-presumption-ofconstitutionality-revisited (“[T]he Court routinely ignores the presumption in cases
where it strikes down federal laws.”).
See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1987) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (staying the district court order declaring the act unconstitutional because “[t]he presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every Act of Congress” tips the scales in favor of
a stay); see also Walters v. Nat’l Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323, 1324 (1984)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347,1348 (1977)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 506–507 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(summarizing the modern limits on the presumption, suggesting that it does not apply
when “the very legitimacy of the composition of representative institutions is at stake,” to
“legislation endangering fundamental constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, or
denying persons governmental rights or benefits because of race” or to legislation “directly impinging on the basic tripartite structure of our Government”); see also, e.g., Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (suggesting that “[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality” when legislation appears to conflict with
enumerated rights, restricts political processes, or is rooted in “prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities”). Sometimes, the Court suggests instead that the presumption is
merely weakened in these contexts. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (“Where,
as here, we are dealing with what must be considered ‘a basic liberty,’ [t]here are limits to
the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
The Court has, at times, flatly stated—as a truism—that the presumption is reversed in
cases involving “fundamental rights.” See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76
(1980) (“It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.”). There are
definitely contexts, such as speech restrictions, where the Court actively applies a presumption of unconstitutionality rather than of constitutionality. See, e.g., Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid and that the Government bear the burden of
showing their constitutionality . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Playboy
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cation of the modern presumption is limited to a smaller “core”—
such as when the Court considers whether a piece of federal social or
economic legislation has exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers
under the Constitution or violates equal protection in a challenge
56
subject only to rational-basis review. This Article focuses on cases
within this “core” where the modern presumption applies unquestionably and without qualification.
When the presumption does clearly and fully apply, it is not in57
surmountable. However, the presumption does increase the chances that the statute will be upheld, and at least sometimes, for some
Justices, the presumption of constitutionality is itself the determina58
tive factor behind a vote to uphold a statute.
Among scholars, while the countermajoritarian difficulty has received constant, ample attention, the presumption of constitutionali59
ty is somewhat less theorized. However, several commentators have
written both descriptively and normatively about the presumption—
describing what the Court has been doing and arguing about how
strong the presumption should be and how to rationalize its applica60
tion.
As to both descriptive and normative academic efforts, the seminal article is James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 paper, The Origins and Scope
61
of the Doctrine of American Constitutional Law. In his article, Thayer
collected and synthesized cases on the presumption of constitutional62
ity from the Court’s first century. He also articulated a vision of how
the presumption of constitutionality should operate. In Thayer’s

56

57
58
59

60
61
62

Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When the Government restricts speech, the
Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”).
See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1982) (“It
is established beyond peradventure that ‘legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality . . . .’”
(quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323 (1981))); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 607–15 (2000) (applying a presumption of constitutionality when examining
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause in the context of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994).
E.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“What tips the scale for
me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.”).
See, e.g., David M. Burke, The “Presumption of Constitutionality” Doctrine and the Rehnquist
Court: A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 76 (1994)
(“Perhaps because on its face the doctrine appears so unassuming, the ‘presumption of
constitutionality’ doctrine has not engendered anything like the wrath that has befallen
other Supreme Court dogma.”).
See infra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.
Thayer, supra note 1.
Id. at 155 (“I am not stating a new doctrine, but attempting to restate more exactly and
truly an admitted one.”).
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view, the presumption was (and should be) a very strong one, under
which the Court should not invalidate a statute unless its unconstitutionality was “so clear that it is not open to rational question” or “un63
constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Under this approach,
the presumption would operate as a “thumb on the scale” and might
lead a judge to uphold a statute even if he had a fairly strong belief
64
that it might be unconstitutional.
Larry Kramer has argued that Thayer’s theory was itself an evolution of the earlier model of popular constitutionalism, under which
the primary duty and authority to interpret the Constitution was re65
posed in the people themselves. In his view, Thayer’s theory substituted for the earlier vision of the primacy of the people in constitutional interpretation, a related vision of the primacy of the people’s
66
representatives. But, like that older vision, its “main concern . . . was
to reassert that primary authority to interpret the Constitution is outside the courts and that judicial authority to declare statutes unconsti67
tutional is, at most, a subordinate, secondary check.”
Today, few scholars, and no Justices, favor an explicitly Thayerian
68
approach. Instead, as the Court’s application of the presumption
seems to have gotten weaker, many academic theorists have moved
from recognizing and advocating a very robust presumption of constitutionality to advocating a much weaker presumption, or advocating dispensing with the presumption entirely. Randy Barnett, for ex63
64

65

66
67
68

Thayer, supra note 1, at 144, 151.
Posner, supra note 23, at 537 (“Thayer wanted judges to place a thumb on the scale, so
that . . . the statute would have to be upheld unless no reasonable person could doubt its
invalidity.”); Thayer, supra note 1, at 144 (stating that the Court cannot invalidate a statute “merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is unconstitutional”).
See Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
621, 621 (2012) (“Thayer was not making a new argument. He was, rather, reasserting an
older, Jeffersonian notion that primary authority to interpret the Constitution lies with
the people and not with courts.”); see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELFGOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 86–87 (1992) (“Thayer perceives
judicial review as weakening the responsible exercise of popular sovereignty.”).
Kramer, supra note 65, at 628.
Kramer, supra note 65, at 628 (emphasis omitted).
See Posner, supra note 23, at 533 (“There are few academic Thayerians anymore and no
apostles of restraint on the current Supreme Court.” (footnote omitted)); see also Posner,
supra note 23, at 534 (noting that “there are no orthodox Thayerians” currently on the
federal bench, but identifying two court of appeals judges who come close). One scholar
who has recently seemed to endorse Thayerian deference (or something similar) is Adrian Vermeule, who has argued for very substantial judicial deference to congressional constitutional lawmaking. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009); see
also Posner, supra note 23, at 533 n.55 (describing Vermeule, along with Mark Tushnet
and Robin West, as three of the “few” extant academic Thayerians).
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ample, argues that the presumption of constitutionality is unconstitutional and should be replaced by a contrary “presumption of liberty”
69
under which federal statutes are presumptively invalid. Barnett is
not alone in arguing that the presumption of constitutionality is sus70
pect and should be scrapped altogether. The Court, however, has
not shown any inclination to take up these suggestions by explicitly
abolishing or reversing the presumption of constitutionality, even if it
71
has been accused of effectively doing so in practice. More narrowly,
other scholars have argued that the presumption should be revisited
72
or reduced in specific substantive contexts.
Andrew Hessick has argued that the presumption of constitutionality, as currently applied, is misguided because it functions mainly as
a doctrine of factual deference towards congressional statutes and
does not result in judicial deference to legislative interpretations of
73
the Constitution. In Hessick’s view, the rationales supporting the
presumption of constitutionality better justify a presumption of constitutionality that results in the current deference to congressional interpretations of the Constitution than one that results in factual def74
erence to federal statutes.
Descriptively, several notable scholars and judges think that the
current Court is reaching new depths (or heights) of non-deference
to Congress. Judge Richard Posner has argued that Thayerianism is
essentially a dead-letter on the current Court, attributing this to the
75
rise of constitutional theory and the sense of certainty it promotes.
In Posner’s view, Thayerian deference failed because it was replaced
by the rise of constitutional theory and increased confidence in the
69
70

71
72

73
74
75

RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
60 (2004).
See, e.g., Burke, supra note 59, at 76 (“[T]he doctrine is contrary to the principles underlying the theory of constitutional government and poses a formidable obstacle to the safeguarding of individual liberty.”). Thayer, in contrast, argued that the presumption was
liberty-promoting because searching judicial review would actually weaken popular commitment to liberty and engagement with the Constitution. Thayer, supra note 1, at 155–
56 (“Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief
protection lies elsewhere.”).
See Karlan, supra note 13, at 13.
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of
Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2006) (arguing
against the application of the presumption to Commerce Clause-based criminal legislation).
See generally Hessick, supra note 35 (classing the presumption of constitutionality together
with other restraining doctrines such as constitutional avoidance).
See generally Hessick, supra note 35; see also infra Part III.B (agreeing with Hessick’s arguments about extending interpretive deference).
Posner, supra note 23, at 535–36.
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ability of theory to answer questions of constitutional interpretation.76
Pamela Karlan has argued that the Roberts Court, especially in its
most recent term, displays active hostility to Congress and democratic
processes in general, amounting to a default suspicion of unconstitu77
tionality. Others have argued, however, that the Court’s most recent
Term—and, in particular, Chief Justice John Roberts’ vote in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius—are actually examples of
78
the exercise of an increased, nearly Thayerian level of deference.
This Article’s arguments are situated in the context of the modern
Court’s narrowing and weakening of the presumption and in the literature observing and commenting on that trend. The argument is
not concerned with whether the presumption should exist at all or
when the presumption should apply, but instead with how it should
apply in the core areas, where it clearly and unqualifiedly applies under current doctrine. The basic argument is that when the Court applies a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a federal statute, it
should explicitly apply a stronger presumption in favor of the statute
when the margin of passage is larger, increasing to a maximum level
of extremely robust, Thayerian, beyond-rational-doubt deference.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR ADJUSTING THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY BASED ON MARGIN OF STATUTORY PASSAGE
Against the background of debates over the
difficulty and the evolutions in the doctrine of
constitutionality, this Part argues for adjusting
presumption of constitutionality based on the
passage.

countermajoritarian
the presumption of
the strength of the
margin of statutory

A. Furthering Democratic Values and Popular Constitutionalism
The first and most compelling justification for adjusting the presumption of constitutionality to strengthen with the margin of statu76

77
78

Posner, supra note 23, at 546 (“If they knew a statute was unconstitutional they’d have to
strike it down even in Thayer’s account; and the modern theorists have proved (though
only to their own satisfaction) that they can tell judges which outcomes in constitutional
cases are correct and which incorrect.”). Kramer, in contrast, attributes the decline of
Thayerism to the rise of judicial supremacy in the 1960s and the decline of the older, Jeffersonian model of popular constitutionalism that inspired Thayer’s vision of the presumption of constitutionality. See Kramer, supra note 65, at 621.
Karlan, supra note 13, at 29 ( “[T]he Roberts Court has lost faith in the democratic process.”).
See O’Neill, supra note 47, at 171 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in the Affordable Care Act case was an example of Thayerian deference).
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tory passage is that it furthers democratic values in a way that is responsive to the countermajoritarian difficulty. This argument rests
on the basic premise that if it is troublingly undemocratic for a federal court to strike down a duly enacted federal statute, this is more
troublingly undemocratic to do so the larger the margin by which the
statute passed. That is, the larger the margin of passage, the larger
the proportion of the people (as represented in Congress) whose will
is thwarted by invalidating the statute. For statutes passed by a narrow margin, in contrast, the antidemocratic concern is less.
Inherent in the democratic principles underlying the Constitution
is not just the idea that a bare majority should be respected because it
represents the will of the people, but also the idea that larger majorities more strongly represent the will of the people, and are entitled to
79
more sway. Since the essence of the countermajoritarian concern is
that it is problematically undemocratic for unelected judges to overturn a law supported by a majority of the public, the problem becomes greater for laws passed by a larger percentage of representa80
tives because more of the public is being thwarted. Thus, as the
margin of passage gets larger, the argument gets stronger for deferring to the people’s view that legislation is necessary (and constitu81
tional).
Since the antidemocratic concern becomes greater for statutes
passed by larger margins, the Court should adjust its presumption of
constitutionality to apply it more strongly as the margin gets larger.
Conversely, when a statute passes by a narrow margin, there is reduced concern about thwarting the legislative expression of the popular will because the popular will is more equivocal. The presumption of constitutionality should be weaker.

79

80

81

This theoretical and philosophical principle is reflected in the Constitution’s provisions
providing special powers to congressional supermajorities. See infra Part II.B; Brett W.
King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: The Framers, The Federalist Papers
and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 369 (1998)
( “[T]he Constitution’s supermajority requirements should more accurately be viewed as
mechanisms which reinforce notions of popular sovereignty . . . .”).
This is more obviously and directly true with respect to the House, since the Senate is itself a countermajoritarian institution because its federal structure leads to disproportionate representation. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 49–62. But even in the Senate, a
smaller majority is less likely to represent the popular will. Indeed, a narrow Senate majority often represents less than even a bare majority of the population. See Benjamin Eidelson, Note, The Majoritarian Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980, 1007 (2013) (noting that in
thirty-four percent of the filibusters between 1991 and 2010, the majority supporting cloture actually represented less than half of the national population).
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 65, at 634 (criticizing judicial supremacy and arguing for reviving popular constitutionalism).
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This is consistent with one of the Court’s own primary rationales
for applying the presumption of constitutionality—respect for demo82
Since the presumption of constitutionality is
cratic lawmaking.
rooted (at least in part) in deference to legislative expressions of majority will, the deference should be greater when the majority is larger.
Even for those who defend the legitimacy of judicial review on the
83
basis of imperfections in our representative system, this argument
should still have some force. Although there are problems in our
federal system’s mechanism for translating popular will into legislative action, these issues become less salient the larger the legislative
majority—a statute that passes overwhelmingly is more likely to re84
flect the popular/democratic will. And, for statutes passed by narrower margins, these concerns are more trenchant—there is a greater
chance that a statute narrowly passed will fail to reflect the popular
will, either because of structural defects in our system of representa85
86
tion or sometimes because of shenanigans undertaken to narrowly
87
effect the passage of a particular bill. Thus, strengthening the presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of passage actually

82
83
84

85

86

87

See supra notes 37–38; Hessick, supra note 35, at 1462–67 (describing and summarizing
cases advancing this rationale for the presumption).
See supra notes 15–17.
Cf. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1391 (“The system of legislative elections is not perfect either, but it is evidently superior as a matter of democracy and democratic values to the
indirect and limited basis of democratic legitimacy for the judiciary.”).
See, e.g., Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch,
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 127
(Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2006) (arguing that legislation reflects majority public opinion only “roughly 55 to 65 percent of the time”).
Such as logrolling, arm-twisting, or enticement through earmarks. See, e.g., Richard L.
Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1339–48 (2000) (examining desirability of legislative logrolling from perspectives of “equality, efficiency, and inalienability”); Rebecca
M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 519, 523–24 (2009) (arguing for a rule of statutory construction that would reject
statutory interpretations proposed by “special interests” when those interpretations would
confer benefits not disclosed by Congress’s own earmark-disclosure rules).
For example, if one is concerned about special interests’ power to persuade members of
Congress to vote contrary to their constituents’ preference (and thinks that the courts
should correct such deformations), this concern would diminish for statutes passed by
larger margins because it is harder for special-interest lobbies to subvert legislative supermajorities (or near-supermajorities) than bare majorities. See John O. McGinnis &
Michael Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
365, 458–59 (1999) (arguing that when special interests generally favor additional spending, a supermajority rule may more closely reflect majority sentiment on spending than
majority rule).
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accommodates arguments that judicial review is justified based on
flaws in our democratic processes.
A larger margin of passage not only reflects a larger democratic
majority inherently entitled to more deference, but also reflects a
stronger assertion by Congress (and by representation, the people
themselves) that the statute is constitutional. Another of the Court’s
primary justifications for applying a presumption of constitutionality
(besides respect for democratic majorities) is that the premise that
Congress considers the Constitution when it legislates and that the
Court should give some deference to Congress’s belief that the stat88
ute it has passed is constitutional. Beyond the Court’s assertion,
there is also some evidence to support this premise that Congress
does consider the constitutionality of the statutes it passes, although
89
th
the point is contested. Indeed, as of the 112 Congress, the House
88

89

See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (“The usual presumption is that
Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of office, considered the constitutional
issue and determined the amended statute to be a lawful one . . . .”); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on
the meaning and force of the Constitution . . . . Were it otherwise, we would not afford
Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy.”); Hessick, supra note 35,
at 1462–68 (discussing this “due respect” rationale); Hanah Metchis Volokh, Constitutional
Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV. 173, 182 (2013) (noting that under current
doctrine, “[t]he act of passing the statute, alone, is seen as a congressional statement that
the statute is constitutional in Congress’s opinion”).
See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 62–65 (1986) (examining Congress’s duty to consider constitutionality when legislating); Lee Epstein, Who Shall Interpret the Constitution?, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1307, 1310 (2006) (reviewing NEAL DEVINS & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, EDS.,
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2005)) (arguing that, based on some of the work collected in the reviewed book, “Congress may not be as wanting as some skeptics seem to
think” when it comes to seriously engaging in constitutional interpretation); Louis Fisher,
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985) (analyzing
Congress’s duty to interpret the Constitution and its performance of that duty using three
specific examples); Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
127, 150 (2004) (concluding, based on two surveys of Congress members taken in 1956
and 1999–2000, that at both times, “a plurality of . . . respondents favor independent
congressional analysis of constitutional questions while also asserting that Congress examines constitutional questions in a bona fide way”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference
and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656,
657–58 (2000) (describing scholarship on non-judicial branches’ power and duty to interpret the Constitution); Volokh, supra note 88, at 186–212 (discussing the role of constitutional authority statements in the work of congressional constitutional interpretation); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1367 (2011) (arguing that members of Congress did consider constitutionality
when passing the ACA). For arguments that Congress does not seriously consider constitutionality, see, for example, Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution
When Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 261 (2012) (arguing that Con-
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formally requires a “constitutional authority statement” for each bill,
90
explaining which constitutional power supports it.
If Congress does consider the Constitution when it legislates (as
the Court presumes and some evidence suggests), a larger margin of
passage indicates that Congress has more confidently asserted a belief
that the law is constitutional. Since the judicial presumption of constitutionality is based in part on the assumption that Congress will
perform its duty and exercise its ability to consider constitutionality
before enactment, federal courts should apply a stronger presumption of constitutionality when Congress has more unequivocally en91
dorsed the statute’s constitutionality.
Exercising a stronger presumption in favor of larger legislative
majorities is also consistent with the Constitution’s structures and
92
principles. The Constitution expressly empowers supermajorities in
several ways. Two of the most notable are that a two-thirds vote of
Congress allows proposing a constitutional amendment and overrid93
ing a presidential veto. The Constitution thus empowers supermajorities of the people’s representatives to initiate a change of the
Constitution itself, and to override the prerogatives of other branches. The underlying principle is that larger majorities of the people
(through their representatives) should have more power to make pol94
icy and change the meaning of the Constitution. By analogy, the
size of the voting majority that approves a given statute can and
should inform the Court’s assessment of whether a statute has been
sufficiently proven to be unconstitutional, whether a statute contradicts the meaning of a particular constitutional provision, and wheth-

90
91
92

93

94

gress did not seriously consider and debate the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act before passing it); Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011) (arguing that party polarization is responsible for the decline in congressional consideration of the constitutionality
of statutes and in the necessary constitutional fact-finding to support statutes).
H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (adopting rules for the 112th Congress, including the
Constitutional Authority Statement requirement); Volokh, supra note 88, at 186–212.
For the objection that it is naïve to presume that members of Congress in fact do consider
constitutionality when they vote, see infra Part IV.D.
Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 839 (1991) (“[W]e must ground all methodological commitments in the Constitution before we can recognize them as legitimate.”).
Others include impeachment convictions (two-thirds Senate majority), treaty ratification
(two-thirds Senate majority), U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and restoring to Civil War rebels the ability to hold United States public office (two-thirds of each house), U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 3.
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 703, 705 (2002) (“[T]he central principle underlying the Constitution is governance through supermajority rules.”).
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er the Court should reconsider, overrule, or limit its own constitutional-interpretation precedents in order to uphold the statute.
The argument is not that larger legislative majorities actually can
amend the Constitution without following the formal amendment
95
process, but merely that when the Court considers difficult questions about whether a federal statute is unconstitutional, it can and
should consult the margin of statutory passage in deciding that question, in addition to its own doctrines and theories of constitutional
interpretation. And the Constitution’s own formal mechanisms for
privileging supermajorities implicitly support this approach.
B. Qualitative Superiority of Supermajority Enactments—Better Laws and
Better Assessments of Constitutionality
Deferring more to larger majorities through a stronger presumption of constitutionality is not only warranted by democratic principles, it is also warranted because a statute passed by a larger majority
is actually more likely to be a superior law, and also to be constitutional. That is, while the first argument in favor of an adjustable presumption is simply that larger majorities have a stronger claim to deference because they are larger, this argument focuses on the point
that larger majorities are more likely to be right—either about the
quality of the legislation itself or about its constitutionality.
A substantial body of scholarship has argued that supermajority
decisions are better than bare majority decisions. Among the leading
scholars making this argument are John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who have argued in a series of articles that supermajority
rules, like the ones that governed the ratification and amendment of
the Constitution, tend to produce superior results in terms of the
quality of legislation, as well as answer difficult questions about con96
stitutional rights and structure. Since supermajority rules produce
95

96

The theory is thus more limited than arguments like those of Bruce Ackerman, who has
argued that in important “constitutional moments” the people can act to fundamentally
change the structure and meaning of the constitution. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1052 (1984) (arguing that the New Deal “moment” resulted in
the “legitimation of the activist welfare state”).
See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1702 (2010) (arguing that supermajority rule is “the voting rule most
conducive to generating a good constitution”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007) (arguing for
originalism on the theory that the supermajority rules under which the clauses were originally enacted were likely to have resulted in the most desirable provisions.); McGinnis &
Rappaport, supra note 94, at 805 (“The Constitution binds us because the double super-
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better results, the Court should be more careful before overturning
laws passed by larger votes—the Court should presume more strongly
that these laws are constitutional because they are more likely to be of
higher quality, and to be correct in how they address or resolve difficult questions about the limits of constitutional rights and structure.
Further, other leading scholars, such as Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule, have argued that the Court should defer to majority legislation because, as the product of “many minds,” legislatures have cer97
tain epistemic advantages over courts. While these arguments are
98
not unqualified, and also not specifically focused on the size of the
enacting majority, they can support this Article’s argument. As the
majority grows larger, it becomes more likely that the legislature’s
judgment is epistemically sound and less likely that it is the product
of “information pathologies” such as informational cascades or polar99
ization in deliberative processes. Therefore, the argument for judicial deference is stronger.
These same arguments about the advantages of supermajority decisions can also be applied to the specific question of Congress’s own
assessment of a statute’s constitutionality under prevailing doctrine.
That is, because supermajority decisions are superior to bare-majority
decisions, not only is it more likely that the legislation is better, it is
also more likely that Congress is right about whether the statute is
constitutional. This secondary argument does presume that Congress
actually considers the constitutionality of statutes before passing
100
But, as noted above, the presumption-of-constitutionality
them.
doctrine is based, at least partially, on Court’s assumption that Con101
gress does consider the Constitution when it legislates. And, there
is evidence that Congress does see itself as having an independent
102
duty to consider the Constitution when it legislates. Since the doc

97

98
99

100
101
102

majoritarian requirements of formation and amendment ensures that its provisions generally have higher quality than ordinary legislation.”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note
87, at 401 (arguing that supermajority rules are better than bare majority rules for making spending decisions).
CASS SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (2009); Vermeule, supra note 68, at 82
(“[C]urrent legislatures are the decisionmakers in the best position, insofar as epistemic
considerations are concerned, to oversee common-law constitutionalism.”).
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 212.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 80 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
Note, however, that the main argument does not.
See supra note 88.
See supra note 89.
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trine is based on the assumption that Congress considers the Constitution when it legislates, it should also acknowledge that Congress’s
assessment is more likely to be correct for statutes that pass by larger
margins.
C. Improved Judicial Legitimacy
Applying an adjustable presumption tied to margin of passage
would also improve judicial legitimacy. The Court has expressed
concerns about exercising its power of judicial review in ways that
103
Further, popular appreserve or promote the Court’s legitimacy.
proval of the Court—perhaps a proxy for public perception of the
104
So, it is imCourt’s legitimacy—is currently at an all-time low.
portant to consider whether adjusting the presumption of constitutionality might improve the Court’s legitimacy in the public’s eyes, in
particular because the Court itself would be more likely to do so if the
Justices believed that it would be legitimacy-enhancing rather than
105
legitimacy-destroying.
Applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality would
improve and preserve judicial legitimacy in two ways. The first is that
the Court’s legitimacy would improve because it would be less likely
to strike down very popular statutes. Since judicial review is somewhat controversial and can be perceived as antidemocratic, courts
striking down duly-enacted statutes can be, and often are, perceived
as acting illegitimately. And, just as the countermajoritarian problem
106
increases with the margin of passage, so too does the perception of
103

104

105

106

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867–68 (1992) (explaining
the importance of adhering to prior decisions exercising the power for preserving the
Court’s legitimacy); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012)
(“It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”).
Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1 (“Those findings are a fresh indication that the court’s standing with the public has slipped significantly in the past quarter-century . . . .”); Sam Baker,
High Court’s Approval Rating Hits New Low Ahead of Health Ruling, THE HILL, (May 1, 2012,
1:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/legal-challenges/224799-approval-ofsupreme-court-hits-new-low-as-politically-charged-cases-loom (“Public opinion of the Supreme Court is at an all-time low . . . .”); Meghashyam Mali, Poll: Supreme Court’s approval
rating drops below 50 percent for first time, THE HILL, (June 25, 2013, 8:51 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/313407-poll-supreme-courtsapproval-drops-below-50-percent (“The Supreme Court’s favorability rating has dropped
below 50 percent for the first time . . . .”).
For a response to the objection that adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based
on margin of passage would actually undermine judicial legitimacy by making it seem that
the Court caves to political pressure, see discussion infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part I.A.
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illegitimacy. That is, a court striking down legislation endorsed by an
overwhelming majority of the people’s representatives is more likely
107
Conversely,
to be unpopular and viewed as acting illegitimately.
when the statute passed narrowly, the portion of the populace that
will consider the Court illegitimate in striking it down is likely to be
108
Adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based on
smaller.
the margin of passage would address this problem because it will
make the Court less likely to strike down statutes passed by overwhelming margins, and so produce fewer critical hits to the Court’s
legitimacy.
To this, a critic might respond that deferring more to more popular laws is exactly what the Court already does, precisely because of
109
concerns about judicial overreach and loss of legitimacy. However,
if so, it is better that the Court admit as much, which is the second
way that incorporating the margin of passage into the presumption of
constitutionality would improve judicial legitimacy—by alleviating
perceptions of illegitimacy arising when the Court’s articulated reasons do not contain the perceived real reason for its decision.
On several occasions in the Court’s history, it has been perceived
that the Court has declined to strike down statutes precisely because
they were very popular or part of a legislative program that com110
It has also been proposed
manded substantial majority support.
that the Court hesitated in these instances specifically because of
107

108

109

110

This does presume that actual popular will correlates with margin of statutory passage,
but even critics of the representativeness of Congress do seem to conclude that there is
some connection between the two. See, e.g., Peretti, supra note 85, at 127.
This is based on the assumption that on average, someone who supported a statute or
policy is more likely to see invalidation as not only wrong, but illegitimate, while someone
who opposed it is less likely to fret about the legitimacy of the Court’s decision to invalidate a statute they disagree with on policy grounds.
See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279, 286 (1957) (arguing that over time, “lawmaking majorities
generally have had their way”); see also supra note 15 (collecting other examples of this argument).
Perhaps the most famous example is the “switch in time that saved nine” of W. Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). A more recent example is NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S.
Ct. 2504 (2009). See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by
the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 218 (speculating that the Court’s avoidance ruling in NAMUDNO may have been motivated by “fears that full-blown constitutional pronouncement would harm its legitimacy”). See generally John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 354 (2010) (noting the
phenomenon of cases “in which the United States Supreme Court has appeared to back
down in the face of political pressures or threats”). If NAMUDNO was indeed motivated
by fears about overturning a popular statute, however, the Court overcame those fears in
fairly short order when it took the further step of striking down Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act in the most recent Term. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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concerns about being perceived as illegitimate—invalidating policies
preferred by large majorities. Since the Court has limited political
111
capital as the “least dangerous branch,” it must, for institutional
reasons, be careful about striking down widely popular legislative (or
112
Moreover, there has been a substantial literature,
executive) acts.
especially in political science, devoted to arguing that there is no
countermajoritarian problem at all because the Court absorbs and
113
accommodates itself to majoritarian political preferences.
Yet, decisions perceived as rooted in judicial consciousness of
popularity (as reflected in vote margin) generally have not expressly
acknowledged the popularity of the statutes as part of the reasoning
supporting the decision. This may create a different sort of perception of illegitimacy: that the Court is acting illegitimately in the sense
of being disingenuous, or motivated by institutional selfishness and
114
self-preservation. If the Court were to apply an adjustable presumption of constitutionality tied to margin of statutory passage, these perceptions could be alleviated. A Court which decided to uphold a
statute against constitutional challenge (in part) because it was very
popular could say so and rely on that fact as a legal reason for its de115
If considering the amount of popular support for an encision.
actment—and not just the fact of statutory passage—became a legitimate legal reason, then the gap between realist and formalist
explanations for the Court’s actions and motivations could be help116
fully lessened.

111
112

113
114

115

116

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 110, at 218; Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, Or Felix the Cat,
107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 631 (1994) (describing the prevailing assessment of the West Coast
Hotel “switch in time” as motivated by the Court’s political fears).
See supra notes 14, 109.
See Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 104 (“Just one in eight Americans said the justices decided cases based only on legal analysis.”). Similar criticisms were leveled heavily at Chief
Justice Roberts by critics disappointed with his vote in the Sebelius case. See, e.g., Gregory
P. Magarian, The Lawlessness of Sebelius 26–27 (Aug. 9, 2012) (unpublished paper), available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&
context=gregory_magarian (speculating that Roberts’ Sebelius vote, if motivated by a desire to preserve the Court’s institutional authority, failed in doing so).
In addition, a Court that invalidated a statute passed by large margins would do so only
after explicitly applying a very strong presumption in its favor based on its popularity,
which in turn might reduce the perception that the Court was thwarting a large majority
for merely political reasons.
The counterargument—that it would be harmful for the Court to be seen to be openly
bowing to “political pressure” in arriving at its decisions—is addressed in Part IV.C.
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D. Decreased Reliance on Subjective Extraconstitutional Theorizing, Policy
Preferences, and Opportunistic Rhetoric of Restraint
A further advantage of applying an adjustable presumption based
on margin of statutory passage is its relative objectivity, which could
produce a more direct fidelity to democratic principles and popular
constitutionalism than some other theories seeking to palliate the
countermajoritarian problem. In attempting to address the problems
created by the countermajoritarian difficulty, many theorists have devised various frameworks or concepts designed to explain or lay a
path for alternate forms of constitutional change driven by the legislatively-expressed popular will. Examples include Bruce Ackerman’s
117
theory of “constitutional moments” or Eskridge and Ferejohn’s
theory of “super statutes,” under which certain statutes can be assessed to be particularly important and thus particularly deserving of
118
judicial deference based on factors besides the statutory text itself.
The disadvantage of these sorts of theories, though, is that they
require necessarily subjective and extraconstitutional assessments of
factors outside the statute itself. Constitutional moments theory requires assessing history and politics to judge whether a given period
or legislative program is a constitutional moment or just “normal pol119
itics.” And the “super-statute” theory requires subjective determinations about whether the statute embraces a lofty goal and whether it
120
These sorts of ashas been subsequently embraced by the public.
sessments invite the theorist (or the jurist) to pick statutes based on
policy preferences and then acclaim them as sufficiently “momen-

117

118

119

120

1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 95 (distinguishing between periods of normal politics, and moments of constitutional politics—such as the Framing, Reconstruction, and the New Deal—when the People mobilize to resolve issues of great constitutional and political import).
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215 (2001) (arguing that a statute is “super” when it (1) “seek[s] to establish a new normative or institutional framework for state policy,” (2) “over time ‘stick[s]’ in the public culture, and (3)
has “a broad effect on the law”). These theories may not be aimed solely at the countermajoritarian difficulty, but both are arguments that certain sorts of statutes or legislative
programs should receive more judicial deference because they are more authentically
representative of popular will. They are not the only theories in this vein—examples are
legion—but they are particularly well-thought out, and influential, and so make good foils
for the argument.
See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, supra note 95, at 1055–56
(“[C]onstitutional moments . . . allow[] Americans to place a constitutional meaning upon a sustained series of electoral victories and legislative successes that is very different
from the meaning ordinarily attached to any single episode of normal politics.”).
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 118, at 1217.
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tous” or “super” based on a motivated reading of the relevant history
and currents of popular opinion.
Looking to the margin of passage, in contrast, removes filters of
subjective assessments about the historical popularity, importance, or
policy wisdom of an enactment and gives the Court an objective indication based purely on the actual degree of representative democratic endorsement. It allows the Constitution to be treated as somewhat
flexible, or “living,” but lets the organic evolution be driven by objective evidence of legislatively expressed popular will rather than the
121
preferences of judges or theorists.
Similarly, the Court itself has proceeded through phases in terms
of which constitutional rights or provisions it enforces more rigorously. The Court went from rigorous enforcement of the Commerce
122
Clause in the Hammer v. Dagenhart era to almost total nonenforce123
ment of that restriction for decades, with a resurgence under the
124
Rehnquist Court in cases like United States v. Lopez and United States
125
v. Morrison, followed by a retreat under the Roberts Court in cases
126
like Gonzales v. Raich and a limited revival in National Federation of
127
Federalism limitations were almost
Independent Business v. Sebelius.
entirely unenforced through judicial invalidation of federal statutes
before the Rehnquist Court began vigorously policing federalism lim128
its, only to cease expanding, and arguably retreat, under the late
129
130
Rehnquist and early Roberts Court .
121

122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Contra, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 44–45 (1997) (“[T]he most glaring defect of Living Constitutionalism . . . is that
there is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle of the evolution.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 639, 695 (1976) (condemning the version of living constitutionalism that prescribes that “nonelected members of the federal judiciary may address themselves to a social problem simply because other branches of government have failed or refused to do
so”).
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that Congress had power, under the Commerce Clause, to
outlaw home-grown marijuana).
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (stating that the Affordable Care Act was beyond Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers).
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act as exceeding Congress’s power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating provisions of Age Discrimination in Employment Act as exceeding Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding
that Congress may not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts);
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Through these sorts of evolutions, the Court’s decisions about
which rights to privilege and which restrictions to enforce robustly
have been driven by the Justices themselves. It could be argued that
these changes are democratic, because the Justices are nominated
and confirmed by representative actors, because they are drawn from
the people themselves and so share popular opinions about constitutional evolution, or because they are aware of and respond to popular
131
However, this sort of second-order representativeness is
opinion.
suspect, especially in the modern era, as Justices serve long past the
departure of the representative officials who nominated and confirmed them and are ever more narrowly drawn from the ranks of
132
former federal appellate judges with elite pedigrees. Further, there
have been many instances in the Court’s history when shifts in the hierarchy or importance of various constitutional rights and prohibitions seem to have originated from the Court itself, not from demo133
cratic pressures.

129

130

131
132

133

Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 628 (1999)
(holding that patent legislation could not be upheld as valid congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity pursuant to Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity through exercise of its Commerce
Clause powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down as unconstitutional provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that “commandeered”
state law enforcement officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding
that the “take title” provision of the radioactive-waste statute violated the Tenth Amendment).
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act as validly abrogating state sovereign immunity through Congress’s
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 as valid abrogations of state sovereign immunity through Congress’s powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See Christopher Banks & John Blakeman, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and New Federalism Jurisprudence, 38 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM 576, 576 (2008) (concluding, based on a
review of the Roberts Court’s federalism decisions, that it is uncertain whether the Court
will as vigorously police federalism restrictions as the Rehnquist Court).
See supra notes 14, 119.
See Karlan, supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that the fact that none of the Court’s current
members have any experience as elected officials may be responsible for their disdain for
legislative enactments); Pildes, supra note 14, at 117.
Examples of this, in my opinion, would include the Court’s vigorous enforcement of economic restrictions during the Lochner era (prior to the West Coast Hotel climbdown), see,
e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); the Warren Court’s criminal-procedure
revolution, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); the Rehnquist Court’s federalist revival, see, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); and the Roberts
Court’s revival of the Second Amendment as an enforceable limit on government firearm
restrictions, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Even for those who believe that judicial review is an essential
check on the majority’s power to infringe others’ constitutional
rights, it seems far less desirable that choices about which rights to
privilege should also be made in a countermajoritarian, unrepresentative fashion. Applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of passage would let the people’s representatives speak about which constitutional restrictions should be
considered more or less important at a given time. It gives more latitude to statutes passed by a larger margin when reviewed for compliance with the constitutional text as construed by the evolving doctrines of the Supreme Court. Or, at a minimum, incorporating a
presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of passage
might inject some democratic responsiveness into these undemocratic evolutions.
Further, adopting an adjustable presumption of constitutionality
tied to the objective indicia of the margin of passage might also check
the trend for the Justices to use judicial restraint mainly as a rhetorical tool, while actually voting to invalidate statutes essentially on ideo134
logical lines. A statute passed by a larger margin would command
more deference and one by a narrower margin less—so there would
be some objective standard on which to peg the Court’s changing
statements and applications of the principle that the Court should
give federal statutes a presumption of constitutionality somewhere
between beyond a rational doubt and the benefit of the doubt.
E. Practical Virtues of Easier Adoption
Finally, the proposal for an adjustable presumption has the practical virtue that it could be implemented solely by the Court itself.
Proposals for ameliorating the countermajoritarian difficulty by statute or constitutional amendment rarely seem to generate great support, with a few limited exceptions, and none has actually been en135
It thus seems that, even if very innovative, these
acted into law.

134

135

See Epstein & Martin, supra note 48, at 737 (arguing that the empirical evidence indicates
that since 1969, Justices generally vote to uphold or invalidate statutes based on ideological preferences); Kramer, supra note 65, at 634 (arguing that it is harmful that judicial
deference has become essentially “a rhetorical tool used opportunistically by pretty much
all of the Justices”).
For a summary of the history of such efforts, including a description of several “waves” of
enthusiasm for somehow restricting judicial review, see Caminker, supra note 8, at 115.
On the obstacles raised by Article V to any such change actually happening, see, for example, LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 159–166; Sanford Levinson, Op-Ed., Our Imbecilic Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A23 (“But if one must choose the worst single part
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sorts of external proposals have a small chance of ever being enact136
It is much more likely that the Court itself would or could
ed.
evolve its jurisprudence of constitutional adjudication to incorporate
137
a concept of an adjustable presumption of constitutionality, just as
it has already evolved or adjusted the presumption for other rea138
Further, since many of the Court’s most controversial decisons.
sions invalidating federal statutes are 5-4 decisions, it would only require one Justice to adopt the approach for it to potentially make a
significant difference in outcomes. Thus, the argument described
above has the additional virtue of easier practical implementation.
In summary, courts can and should adjust the presumption of
constitutionality so that it is stronger for statutes passed by larger
margins. Doing so would promote democratic values and popular
constitutionalism in a less subjective way than jurist- or theorist-driven
constitutional evolution, cohere with the Constitution’s supermajoritarian principles and provisions, and improve the judicial legitimacy
of the Supreme Court. The next Part considers how such an adjustable presumption might work and when it might apply
III. APPLYING AN ADJUSTABLE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
If it makes sense to exercise a stronger presumption of constitutionality in favor of statutes passed by larger margins in Congress, it
becomes necessary to consider how and when the principle might be
applied. The “how” discussion focuses on describing maximums and
minimums for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality, both in
terms of the strength of the presumption and in terms of the size of
the margin required to trigger them. The “when” discussion explains
that the adjustable presumption would apply only in the core of cases
where the Court currently uncontestably applies the presumption
and offers some thoughts about the types of cases in which applying
an adjustable presumption might make a difference.

136

137

138

of the Constitution, it is surely Article V, which has made our Constitution among the
most difficult to amend of any in the world.”).
See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 68 (arguing for changing the American system of lawmaking so that Congress can pass “liquidating statutes” codifying certain interpretations of
the Constitution).
For a response to the objection that while it might be easier for such a proposal to be implemented by the Court itself, it also makes it more improbable because the Court would
never rein in its judicial supremacy, see infra Part IV.F.
See supra Part I.B.
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A. How an Adjustable Presumption Could Work
To see how the Supreme Court might apply an adjustable presumption of constitutionality to federal statutes, it is helpful to start
by defining limits. There are two questions to answer here: (1) what
are the strongest and weakest presumptions of constitutionality that
should be applied, and (2) what are the maximum and minimum
margins of passage to associate with those limits.
At its weakest, the presumption should be no weaker than the presumption as applied by the modern Court. While the doctrinal con139
tent of the presumption in its current form is not clear, it seems
that the current Court at least sometimes applies the presumption of
constitutionality as a mere tiebreaker, akin to a preponderance burden of proof, so that when the evidence is in equipoise, the statute
140
receives the benefit of the doubt. It also seems clear that the Court
currently does not consider that the presumption calls for any particular deference to Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution (in contrast to evidentiary issues relating to whether a statute is constitutional).
This, then, would be the lower limit of the adjustable
presumption—both since it is the weakest form of the presumption
described in the Court’s cases and since it seems to be the weakest
141
form of deference that still can qualify as a presumption.
On the other end, there is the maximum—the presumption at its
strongest. Probably the strongest articulation of the presumption is
Thayer’s view (drawn from the Court’s earlier cases) that the Court
should not overturn a statute unless it can be shown to be unconstitu142
tional beyond a reasonable doubt. This is what shall be the maximum strength of the adjustable presumption of constitutionality.
Here, again, this seems to be the strongest formulation of the presumption that has been offered while still qualifying as a presumption
143
rather than an absolute command to uphold the statute. Moreover,
139
140
141

142
143

See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J, concurring) (“What tips the
scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.”).
It might be possible to imagine weaker formulations, but the mere-tiebreaker formulation
has the twin virtues of being already present in the Court’s cases and of being fairly easy
to understand and apply.
Thayer, supra note 1, at 140.
It might be possible to imagine even stronger descriptions of the presumption that would
still qualify as merely a presumption, but the Thayerian presumption has the virtue of familiarity—it has been around as an academic and theoretical concept for over 100 years,
it has even older roots in the Court’s own cases, and it has been engaged with by later
scholars and theorists as a maximum of possible deference to Congress. See, e.g.,
Caminker, supra note 8, at 115; Posner, supra note 23, at 521–23.
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Thayer’s formulation itself was drawn from cases from the Court’s
144
first century, so it has the additional virtue of being supported by
precedent, which could be important for convincing the Court that it
would be legitimate to adopt it. Extreme Thayerian deference has
145
fallen out of favor, but it could and should be revived, at least as a
limit to which judicial deference should approach as the margin of
statutory passage approaches the maximum—a Thayerian limit for
the presumption of constitutionality.
At this maximum strength, the presumption would operate as a
“thumb on the scale” that could prompt the Court to uphold a statute
146
This
even if it has significant doubts about its constitutionality.
would extend to requiring a very high level of evidentiary proof to
demonstrate that a particular statute fails to pass the tests for constitutionality prescribed by the Court’s doctrines and a very low bar for
evaluating the sufficiency of supportive congressional fact-findings in
areas where the Court’s doctrines have evolved to require them. Further, at this maximal level, the presumption would extend not only to
147
That is,
factual deference, but also to questions of interpretation.
for a statute passed by a sufficiently large majority, the Court would
also defer to Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution (as reflected in the statute) and potentially reconsider or disregard the Court’s
own interpretations of constitutional texts arising out of the Court’s
148
own doctrines or theories.
So, the presumption would adjust in strength from a minimum of
mere-tiebreaker factual deference, with no interpretive deference, to
a maximum presumption requiring proof of invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, including a strong degree of interpretive deference to
Congress.
Tying these limits to points on the spectrum of margin of statutory
passage, the minimum would be a statute passed by a razor-thin, one-

144
145
146
147

148

See, e.g., Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (each applying a reasonable-doubt formulation of the presumption); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
See supra Part I.B.
See Posner, supra note 23, at 537 (describing the Thayerian presumption in these terms).
See Hessick, supra note 35, at 1450–67 (advancing arguments that, in general, the justifications for the presumption of constitutionality more strongly support interpretive deference than factual/evidentiary deference); see also infra Part III.B (examining reasons for
extending interpretive deference).
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 23, at 537 (explaining how a Thayerian presumption could
lead an originalist Justice to uphold a statute even if contrary to the “best” originalist interpretation of the Constitution); Thayer, supra note 1, at 150 (“[T]he ultimate question
is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable
or not.”).
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vote margin in both houses.149 Thus, the presumption would be
weakest, and deference limited to a mere tiebreaker at equipoise, for
statutes that barely squeak through.
As to the maximum—the limit at or beyond which the strongest
version of the presumption would apply—there are at least two natural possibilities. One would be the unanimous statute. Unanimous
passage is as much representative or democratic endorsement as a
statute can get and so would be an easy definition for the limit at
which the strongest, Thayerian presumption of constitutionality
would apply.
The better approach, however, would be to set the maximum at
150
supermajority passage (in both Houses). There are good structural
arguments for this approach: a Congressional supermajority is
151
enough to propose a constitutional amendment and to override a
152
Presidential veto. Larger vote margins in Congress have no formal
effect under the Constitution—that is, there is nothing that a unanimous Congress can do that a supermajority Congress cannot. Therefore, it should be enough to trigger the strongest possible presumption of constitutionality when a supermajority of both Houses votes to
153
pass a statute.
Statutes actually passed by unanimous or near-unanimous votes
are more rare, so if the strongest presumption were limited to those
statutes, it would have less practical effect. The proposal to adjust the
presumption of constitutionality is intended to actually increase the
deference given to very popular statutes (for the reasons discussed
above in Part II), and having the maximum presumption kick in at
supermajority approval would further this goal.

149

150

151
152
153

Theoretically, the narrowest possible margin of passage would be a statute passed by one
vote in the House, and by a tiebreaking Vice-Presidential vote in the Senate. Since the
proposal is for an adjustable presumption, however, the potential difference between a
51-49 Senate vote and a 51-50 Senate vote is not critical. As for the possible problems
arising from discrepancies in the vote margin between the two houses, and some
thoughts about solutions to these problems, this is discussed further infra Part IV.E.
By supermajority, I mean a two-thirds supermajority of voting members, as referred to in
the Constitution. For a discussion of different ways to count the “denominator” for majority votes and possible consequences of different approaches, see Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 103, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=791724.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
See supra Part II.B (justifying the adjustable-presumption argument by reference to the
Constitution’s supermajoritarian provisions and scholarship arguing for the superiority of
supermajoritarian requirements).
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Between the extremes, the scale—the amount of deference—
would slide. This Article does not define exactly the scale or the levels of deference applying at different points. The idea of an adjustable presumption is simply to nuance the application of the presumption of constitutionality in a way that is sensitive and responsive to
concerns about the antidemocratic, countermajoritarian difficulty
caused by judicial review using the objective indicator of the margin
of statutory passage. The workings of the sliding scale in intermediate cases could be worked out case by case.
With that said, one natural midpoint between the two extremes of
minimal, tiebreaker deference and maximal, Thayerian deference
would be some sort of “clear showing” deference. This might come
into play when a statute was passed by a relatively large margin even if
not a unanimous or supermajority vote. And here, again, there is
precedent for this formulation of the presumption of constitutionali154
ty in the Court’s cases.
B. When the Adjustable Presumption Would Apply and Potentially Make a
Difference
This Article argues only for the application of an adjustable presumption of constitutionality in the core cases where it is clear that a
presumption of constitutionality applies with full force under current
155
doctrine, without being weakened, lessened, or inverted. Examples
within this core would include social or economic legislation which is
challenged on equal protection grounds or as being beyond Con156
gress’s enumerated powers under the Constitution. But the adjustable presumption, as described in this Article, would not apply in areas such as challenges based on fundamental rights, enumerated
rights, or discrimination against discrete minorities, since the Court
has said that the presumption does not apply with full force (or per157
haps at all) in such areas.
However, for present purposes, this Article does argue for (and
endorse others’ arguments for) expanding the scope of the presumption beyond current doctrine in one significant way—the presumption should extend not only to fact questions, but also to questions of
constitutional interpretation. In particular, Andrew Hessick’s argu-

154
155
156
157

Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981).
See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing areas outside this core, where the Court does not
apply the presumption).
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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ment is correct that the application of the presumption of constitutionality should be extended (or, really, returned) to apply not only
to factual determinations about the evidence required to invalidate a
statute, but also to questions of constitutional interpretation that
158
arise in the course of adjudicating constitutional challenges. In addition, below are thoughts on when and how the strong, Thayerian
form of the presumption might prompt the Court to reconsider doctrine or let theory yield to the expression of popular endorsement.
The presumption has the most limited impact when a statute is
challenged as violating a specific, express constitutional restriction.
For example, if Congress unanimously passed a statute immediately
raising its compensation, even the very strong presumption of constitutionality would not save the statute because the constitutional re159
striction is so clear, and the operative legal test is not based on
judge-made doctrines and glosses grafted onto the text. There could
160
be no “rational doubt” that the law violates the constitutional restriction. Therefore, even the very strong presumption would be
overcome.
Instead, the adjustable presumption would have more effect in areas where constitutional powers and guarantees are more openended and indeterminate, and the actually decisive rules in any given
case will be doctrines and tests formulated by the Court as glosses or
interpretations on the Constitution. Examples would include such
issues as determining whether legislation is “necessary and proper” to
161
execute Congress’s enumerated powers, whether legislation is with162
in Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, whether legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
163
within Congress’s powers to pierce state sovereign immunity, or
164
whether congressional legislation violates the Establishment Clause.
158

159
160
161
162
163
164

See Hessick, supra note 35, at 1460 (noting the difference between the current “presumption of constitutionality” and Thayerian, interpretive deference); Hessick, supra note 35,
at 1461–94 (arguing that the reasons for the presumption support interpretive deference
more than factual or evidentiary deference).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
Thayer, supra note 1, at 142 n.1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2586–91 (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93; United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)
(considering but not deciding the question whether the Congressional Pledge of Allegiance Act violates the Establishment Clause). This Article takes questions under the Establishment Clause to be questions about Congress’s powers rather than questions about
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Put more generally, there would be a wide scope for application of
the adjustable presumption, including in some of the most hotly contested areas of statutory and constitutional interaction in recent
165
So, the adjustable presumption would apply in many cases
years.
that matter.
In these more open-ended areas, applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality would offer an alternative to placing singular
faith in specific theories of interpretation. Rather than making very
close calls based strictly on the contested application of an interpretive theory, Justices instead could look outside the theory to give
weight to the degree of popular endorsement conveyed by the mar166
gin of statutory passage.
Another major way the adjustable presumption would apply would
be in affecting the Court’s application of stare decisis and its willingness to revisit its prior decisions and doctrinal tests. The Court’s application of stare decisis is inconsistent—it has no firm rules about
when to follow its own precedents (and, if it did, it would not be
167
bound to respect them). The Justices sometimes accuse each other
of “faux judicial restraint” that consists of pretending to adhere to
168
precedents while essentially rewriting them. Scholars similarly trace
how the Court can gut prior decisions and lines of precedent under
169
the guise of purporting to respect them. Thus, the Court has room
to be flexible in applying its prior cases.
So, when a statute passes by a wide margin, but seems to run afoul
of the Court’s prior cases, the Court should be most willing to revisit
its own precedents. The main reasons, as indicated above, are that

165

166
167

168

169

infringement on the fundamental rights of citizens and therefore properly within the
“core” the adjustable presumption of constitutionality described by this Article would apply. This, however, is an unconventional position.
For example, the Commerce Clause and Taxing Power as construed in Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
at 2566, or the Voting Rights Act renewal that was struck down by the Court in Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
See infra Part IV.A (discussing room for an adjustable presumption alongside theories
such as originalism).
See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Morse, School Speech, and Originalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
637, 648 (2009) (“In some respects, all of the Justices can be accused of inconsistency in
their invocation of stare decisis.”).
See Berguis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2272 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority “overrules sub silentio an essential aspect” of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 498 n.7
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“This faux judicial
restraint is judicial obfuscation.”).
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 108 (1991) (noting ways in which “the Court can destroy a precedent without overruling it”).
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the countermajoritarian concern is at its strongest when a statute has
passed by a large margin and that a wide margin of passage indicates
both a strong majority will in favor of the legislation and a vocal assertion from the coordinate branch that the legislation is constitution170
al.
This should especially be the case where the Court’s doctrines
have developed elaborately out of relatively simple and open-ended
constitutional texts. One example would be the Court’s jurisprudence under the Establishment Clause. This area is notoriously difficult, vexed, and productive of serial judicial tests designed to imple171
ment the constitutional rule. These tests are generally not derived
from the constitutional text itself. This does not make them inherently wrong or illegitimate—they represent the Court’s efforts to
translate the Constitution’s broad guarantees into rules of specific
application in individual cases. But, it is in areas like this, where the
argument is strongest, that acts of Congress passed by overwhelming
majorities should prompt the Court to review and revisit its own doctrines, operating as a wake-up call to the Court to reexamine the doctrinal tests it has crafted in an attempt to translate constitutional text
172
into rules of decision.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
This Part now considers some of the many objections that might
be leveled at the proposal to adjust the presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of statutory passage and attempts to show
170
171

172

For the contrary argument—that the Court should be most adamant about sticking to
decisions that are the most unpopular—and a response, see infra Part IV.C.
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the display of the Ten
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding that the Establishment
Clause prohibited public school students from being exposed to “nonsectarian” prayer
given by school-selected clergymen at a graduation ceremony); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (holding two statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary
and secondary schools to be violative of the Establishment Clause). Each of these involved challenges to state acts, not congressional statutes, but the same tests have been
applied in Establishment Clause challenges to Acts of Congress. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (considering the constitutionality of a congressional enactment
addressing the Mojave Memorial Cross); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1 (2004) (considering the constitutionality of the “under God” language in the Pledge of
Allegiance added by a near-unanimous act of Congress in 1954).
Hessick, supra note 35, at 1466 (“These laws provide opportunity for the Supreme Court
to reconsider its precedents and allow for the continued development of constitutional
law.”); Thayer, supra note 1, at 150 (“[T]he ultimate question is not what is the true
meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or not.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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that they are unfounded, can be accommodated, or require only limited exceptions.
A. An Adjustable Presumption of Constitutionality Would Be Untethered
from Text and Original Meaning
An initial objection is that applying an adjustable presumption
would be illegitimate because constitutional adjudication is and
should be determinate, without reference to external factors such as
the margin of passage. The Constitution has a fixed content, and the
Court’s duty is to (a) ascertain what the Constitution allows, (b) ascertain what the statute means, and (c) determine whether B is with173
in A. Any presumption or “thumb on the scale” is therefore simply
illegitimate and contrary to the rule-of-law principles at the core of
the American constitutional republic.
But, the claim that the Constitution always has a determinate
meaning is wrong. Constitutional adjudication is indeterminate—not
in all or perhaps even most cases, but in a fair number of the ones
that make it to the Supreme Court, and usually in the most difficult
174
Judicial interpretations of what the
and politically charged ones.
Constitution allows, as well as jurisprudential theories of how to interpret the Constitution, observably vary widely over time, and also
175
within the Court at any given time. Interpretive pluralism has been
176
While constituwidely acknowledged and sometimes celebrated.
tional theorists (and some Justices) put forth one particular interpretive theory or subtheory as the only legitimate way to read the Consti173

174

175

176

See Karlan, supra note 13, at 41 (arguing that the Roberts Court’s approach to judicial review is essentially that of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936), in which the Court
asserted that what it does is to “‘lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged’ in order ‘to decide whether the latter squares with the
former.’”).
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 83 (noting, as one of Thayer’s arguments for his deferential standard, that “many constitutional questions have more than one reasonable answer”).
See, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4–5 (2005) (“There is no law of constitutional interpretation.”).
Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 121, with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3 (2006) (“[C]ourts should take greater
account of the Constitution’s democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and
statutory texts.”).
E.g., PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1–119
(1982) (describing six modalities of constitutional interpretation: (1) structural, (2) textual, (3) ethical, (4) prudential, (5) historical, and (6) doctrinal); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189,
1189–90 (1987) (identifying five types: (1) text, (2) Framers’ intentions, (3) purposive
arguments, (4) precedent, and (5) policy arguments).
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tution, the Supreme Court, taken collectively, rarely (if ever) applies
only one analytical mode to read the Constitution, and the predominant mode of analysis applied by the Court changes over time.
In addition, even within dominant theories, there is significant
indeterminacy that could accommodate majority views as expressed
in legislation enacted by large majorities of the people’s representa177
tives. To take the example of Originalism, the theory was originally
offered as a means to restrict judges perceived to be freewheeling,
but it is acknowledged now that taking Originalism seriously results in
less constraint on judicial behavior, at least in the sense of restraining
178
As the theory shifted
judges from invalidating democratic acts.
179
180
from “original intent” to “original public meaning,” and forked
181
into various subtheories, including the new “living originalism,” it
has gained adherents at the expense of coherence. Sometimes, sufficient historical materials are simply lacking or conflicting enough
that they allow drawing two different supportable interpretive conclu182
Even when there are ample materials, in application,
sions.
Originalism can produce two different answers from two different
183
Justices.
177

178

179
180
181

182

183

Originalist theory is a useful example since that theory (specifically, the “original public
meaning” subtheory) is currently quite popular in academic discourse. See, e.g., Richard
S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 703, 704 (2009) (“In this ‘new and improved’ form, originalism has (mainly) carried
the day: ‘We are all originalists now.’” (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin: The
Achievement of Antonin Scalia, and Its Intellectual Incoherence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at
26)). There are still, however, prominent and assertive deniers. E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“That original intents and meanings matter is not enough to render originalism true.”).
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609
(2004) (tracing the evolution from “old originalism” grounded in twin goals of restraining judicial discretion and deference to legislative majorities to a “new originalism” that
“does not require that judges get out of the way of legislatures . . . [but] requires that
judges uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less”).
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO L.J. 713, 720 (2011).
Id. at 721, 729.
See id. at 725–30 (discussing the evolution of Originalist theory from a focus on “the actual, subjective, and narrow to the hypothetical, objective, and abstract.”). See generally JACK
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2009).
See, e.g., Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1161, 1161 (examining Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), as a
“real example of the impossibility of a New Originalist interpretation when the historical
materials provide clear evidence of equally plausible but conflicting meanings” and suggesting resorting to “Old Originalism’s” focus on Founders’ intent as a solution).
For example, in Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), Justice Scalia concluded that violent video games sold to minors are protected speech based, at least partially, on “what James Madison thought about violence.” Transcript of Oral Argument at
17, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448); see also
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Since constitutional interpretation is debatable and shifting, with
arguments about what interpretive theory to apply and about particular results under a single theory, there is ample room for deference
to the democratic will, specifically in the form of a presumption of
constitutionality that increases based on the margin of statutory pas184
sage. In determining what the Constitution means, especially when
the answer is inconclusive, the people themselves should have an ongoing say, and the main mechanism that the Constitution allows is
185
When a statute is approved
through their elected representatives.
by an overwhelming margin of voters, the people, through their representatives, are vocally asserting that the act is (or should be) within
the bounds of the Constitution, and courts should respect this assertion by applying a stronger presumption of constitutionality.
Thus, adopting a presumption of constitutionality that increases
with the margin of statutory passage would allow a democratic voice
in constitutional interpretation and application, but in a nuanced
way, that would most strongly check the Court when the popular
voice is strongest. It is important to distinguish this, then, from a
“Living Constitution” theory that allows judges to update the meaning of constitutional texts based on their own ideas about what the
186
To the extent
Constitution should allow given modern realities.

184

185

186

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (focusing on the lack of any “longstanding tradition” of “restricting children’s access to depictions of violence”). Justice Thomas, in contrast, concluded
that the statute was constitutional because “the founding generation would not have understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include a right to speak to children without going
through their parents.” Id. at 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Brown is a particularly salient example because Thomas and Scalia are generally perceived to broadly agree on interpretive methodology, political preferences, and actual results. See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice
Stevens’s dissent arriving at opposite conclusions about the original meaning or understanding of the Second Amendment).
Cf., e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 167–68 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)) (describing an approach to originalism that allows a “construction zone” that can accommodate other values or approaches “when the
original meaning of the text is vague or open-textured”).
See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 1, at 144 (“[T]he constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; . . . in such cases the constitution . . . leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”). Admittedly, in Thayer’s view, at its strongest, the deference should extend
even to cases in which a particular interpretive theory does produce a likely answer, so
long as the judge is not sure that it is correct “beyond a rational doubt.” See Posner, supra
note 23, at 537; Thayer, supra note 1, at 144. For the argument that the presumption of
constitutionality should extend not only to factual adjudication, but also to interpretive
deference, see supra Part III.B.
See SCALIA, supra note 121, at 44–45; Rehnquist, supra note 121, at 695.
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that an adjustable presumption allows for constitutional evolution or
flexibility, it would be driven by the people’s representatives, rather
187
than the courts.
A related objection would be the textual argument that it is illegitimate to give a stronger presumption of constitutionality to more
popular laws because the Constitution requires only bicameral major188
ity passage and the president’s signature. Any rule that gives more
force to statutes based on exceeding that threshold, therefore, vio189
lates the Constitution itself. But, the argument is not that a narrowly passed statute is not law or “less law” than an overwhelmingly
passed one. It is instead about an analytical approach the Court
should apply to validly enacted laws when facing difficult questions
about whether they are constitutional.
Further, judicial review is itself extratextual. The Constitution
prescribes no rules or guidelines for how it should be exercised or
190
how to interpret the Constitution. Specifically, the presumption of
191
Thus, objections to the arconstitutionality itself is extratextual.
gument based on the idea that the Constitution has a fixed textual
meaning would bar applying a presumption of constitutionality at all.
If the courts’ duty is simply to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution (by text or original intent) and evaluate the statute accordingly,
then there should be no room for a presumption one way or another.
Certainly, this argument has been made—for example, Randy Barnett has argued that Originalism requires no deference to legislative
acts and even that a countervailing “presumption of liberty” should
192
be adopted under which statutes are presumed to be invalid.
But, this does not seem to be the view taken by the Court. The
Court has said that it does presume congressional acts to be constitu193
tional. Additionally, the Court already exercises discretion in deciding when to apply the presumption (generally based on the type of
194
There is thus no princiconstitutional challenge being asserted).

187

188
189
190
191
192
193
194

See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 550 (2009) (arguing that living constitution theory “is not primarily addressed to
judges but to all citizens”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Cf. Burke, supra note 59, at 76–77 (arguing that the presumption of constitutionality is
itself illegitimate for these reasons).
See, e.g., RUBENFELD, supra note 175, at 4–5.
Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 793 (1997) (criticizing the
presumption of constitutionality because it is “extratextual”).
BARNETT, supra note 69, at 229, 260.
See supra Part I.B.
See id.
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pled reason that if the Court is going to apply the presumption, it
should not apply it in an improved way by adjusting it based on the
margin of statutory passage. Further, as discussed, the Court has frequently been perceived as arriving at its decisions with an unacknowledged eye on the popularity of the statute under review, so it is better
195
for the Court to acknowledge as much in its opinions.
Another textualist objection would be that looking at vote counts
would amount, in a way, to an impermissible inquiry into legislative
196
But, the
intent beyond the plain meaning of the statutory text.
proposed adjustable presumption does not necessarily turn on what
any individual member, or the collective of “yea”-voting members,
thought about the bill. It rests, only in part, on the existing assumption that Congress collectively does consider the Constitution when it
legislates.
B. An Adjustable Presumption Would Be Unprecedented
Despite the justifications for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality discussed above, the federal courts have never explicitly
resorted to vote counting as an analytical framework for deciding
how much deference to give a statute. This does not mean that it
would be completely unprecedented to rely on the margin of passage, however. At various times, the Court or individual Justices have
referred to “overwhelming” margins of passage as carrying analytical,
or at least rhetorical, weight that should prompt more deference to,
197
or more evidence before invalidating, a statute. Moreover, the po195
196

197

See supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 121, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
59 (1988) (criticizing judicial reliance on legislative intent in statutory interpretation).
See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823–24 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is
noteworthy that Congress, in which our country’s religious diversity is well represented,
passed this law by overwhelming majorities . . . .”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
292, 294 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to overwhelming votes in favor of Sentencing Guidelines as demonstrating the Court’s error in holding that they should not be
binding); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09 (1966) (noting, in opinion
upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that “the verdict of both chambers was overwhelming”); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (“The evidence carries
even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue have
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 394 (2000) (“And although majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections, the statewide vote on Proposition A certainly attested to the perception
relied upon here: ‘[A]n overwhelming 74 percent of the voters of Missouri determined
that contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof.’”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 621 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although
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litical branches have also endorsed the idea that the Court should de198
fer especially to statutes that pass with substantial majority support.
On the other hand, some Justices—particularly in recent years—
have affirmatively rejected the idea that the degree of support for the
199
But, the
statute should produce any greater judicial deference.
modest point here is simply that it would not be entirely unprecedented to consult the margin of statutory passage as a relevant fact
affecting how strongly the Court should presume that a statute is constitutional.
Further, the fact that the courts have not historically proclaimed
the importance of the margin of passage in applying a very strong
presumption of constitutionality does not mean that there is no historical precedent for a very robust presumption. Instead, although
resort to the margin of passage has not been an explicit analytical
tool, the Court for much of its history was far more deferential in its
200
review of all federal statutes than it has been in modern times. Although the power of judicial review to invalidate federal statutes was
asserted as early as Marbury v. Madison, the practice of actually invalidating federal statutes for unconstitutionality was quite rare, and the
rhetoric used to describe the presumption of constitutionality was a
201
Thus, in the past,
much more robust “beyond a rational doubt.”
the Court seemed to apply a stout presumption of constitutionality to
all statutes. Incorporating an adjustable presumption of constitu-

198

199

200
201

the Establishment Clause, including its secular purpose requirement, was of substantial
concern to the legislators, they eventually voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Balanced
Treatment Act . . . .”); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“[G]iven the margins by which the 2002 Act passed, it is clear that virtually all
of the members of Congress agreed we had misinterpreted the purpose of the words ‘under God.’”).
See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Obama: Overturning healthcare law would be ‘extraordinary step,’
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/news/la-pn-obamaconfident-supreme-court-will-uphold-healthcare-law-20120402
(quoting
President
Obama’s statement that it would be an “extraordinary step” for the Court to overturn a
law passed “by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress”). The House majority actually was narrow, but the point is the President’s rhetorical appeal to the
strength of the majority vote as a ground for backing down the Court.
See, e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1841 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]f we were debating
whether Congress had a religious purpose in passing the transfer statute, I would contest the
relevance of the vote count to that inquiry . . . .” (emphasis added)); Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322) (Justice Scalia
suggesting that a unanimous or near unanimous vote should be a cause for particular
skepticism, not particular deference); Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) (same).
See Posner, supra note 23, at 534 (tracing the evolution from extreme deference to the
current state in which there are “no orthodox Thayerians” on the federal bench).
See supra Part I.B (tracing the weakening and narrowing of the presumption).
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tionality based on the margin of statutory passage would revive this
level of deference in a limited way and swing the pendulum back towards heightened deference for those statutes that deserve it most,
for the reasons explained above.
C. An Adjustable Presumption Would Harm Judicial Legitimacy by Making
It Appear That the Court Bows to Public Pressure
202
An objection to the argument for increased legitimacy would be
that adopting a presumption of constitutionality that increases based
on the margin of passage would actually decrease the Court’s legitimacy because it would create a perception that the Court was responding or caving in to public pressure—that the Court was behaving as a political actor. The best articulation of this argument by the
Court itself was in Casey, in which the Court explained at length why
adherence to unpopular precedents is especially important to preserve the legitimacy of the Court: “[T]o overrule under fire in the
absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious ques203
If the Court started looking at the margin of passage when
tion.”
reviewing statutory constitutionality, the argument would run, it
would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public because it would be
seen as bowing to “mob rule” rather than making neutral rulings
based on what the Constitution really says.
There are a few responses to this objection. One is that there is
not really any good reason to think that the people would think less
of the Court for upholding a popular statute, even if doing so required revising or overruling the Court’s own precedents. To the
contrary, the evidence of recent polls seems to indicate that popular
opinion of the Court is diminished by the perception that members
of the Court decide cases based on their own political preferences,
204
for extra-legal reasons, in defiance of the majority will.
Another is that since considering the margin of passage would be
brought in to the family of legitimate analytic considerations—on the
theories of respect for majoritarianism and for the strength of Congress’s own assessment of the statute’s constitutionality—there actual-

202
203

204

See supra Part II.C.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). This is the “doubledown” theory of stare decisis—if a decision proves unpopular, the Court must be especially committed to the prior precedent for fear that it will be perceived as weak if it caves
and overrules itself.
See supra note 104 (describing two recent polls reflecting historically low approval of the
Court).
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ly would be less danger of the Court being perceived as having illegit205
Considering public pressure
imately caved to public pressure.
would (and should) be a legitimate constitutional argument—at least
in the limited sense of the will of the people as expressed in a statute
overwhelmingly adopted according to prescribed constitutional pro206
cedures by the people’s duly elected representatives. Thus, adopting an adjustable presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of passage would improve, not undermine, the Court’s legitimacy
with the public.
D. Margin of Passage Is Not a Good Proxy for Congressional or Popular
Endorsement of Constitutionality (Hasty Statutes and Omnibus Bills)
A further objection is that applying a blanket adjustable presumption would be impracticable or unwise because of the many variables
that can affect the number of votes for a particular statute, or a particular provision in a statute, has received. This objection has at least
two distinct aspects. One is a general objection: if members of Congress actually do not consider the constitutionality of legislation when
voting for it, then there should not be any deference to a larger majority’s vote to pass the legislation based on the theory that it reflects
a more vocal assertion by the people’s representatives of the legislation’s constitutionality. The second is a more specific objection that,
even if Congress generally considers constitutionality when it passes
legislation, there are many instances when it does not consider the
constitutionality of specific pieces of hastily passed legislation, or of
specific provisions in much more wide-ranging bills, which later be207
come the subject of specific constitutional challenges.
As to the general objection, the first response is that the arguments for applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality do
not depend solely on the argument that Congress has specifically
205
206

207

See supra Part II.C.
“Public pressure” could also take the form of opinion polls or speech criticizing the
Court’s decision. But, I do not argue that the Court could or should legitimately consider these forms of public pressure in deciding how to apply the presumption of constitutionality. See Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 333 (2012) (identifying a “second countermajoritarian difficulty” in the form of the
Court’s rulings contradicting majority preferences as expressed in political polls). Instead, if there are defects in how well Congress’s acts reflect popular opinion, popular
pressure should be exerted to cure those defects directly.
See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (“The rational and
practical force of the presumption is at its maximum only when it appears that the precise
point in issue here has been considered by Congress and has been explicitly and deliberately resolved.”).
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considered a statute’s constitutionality before passing it. Instead, as
discussed above, there are several arguments for applying such a presumption independent of such consideration—such as democratic
concerns inherently raised by thwarting the will of large majorities,
the Constitution’s own privileging of supermajorities, and academic
208
arguments that supermajorities tend to produce superior laws.
These arguments suggest that, even if Congress does not explicitly
consider constitutional interpretation when it legislates, passage of a
statute by a large majority vote reflects a strong democratic opinion
that the statute should be adopted, and that the Constitution allows
it.
Further, while not uncontroversial, there is significant evidence
that Congress does indeed consider the constitutionality of legislation
209
that it enacts. Moreover, the Court itself assumes as much—this is
one of the substantial bases for the Court’s practice of affording a
210
Thus, as a
presumption of constitutionality to federal legislation.
general matter, it does not seem incorrect to apply an adjustable presumption of constitutionality based, at least in part, on the theory
that Congress considers constitutionality when it legislates and that a
larger margin of statutory passage reflects a more ringing endorsement of a statute’s constitutionality.
To the extent that the objection needs to be accommodated further than this response, it would be sufficient to allow that the presumption could be rebutted, or overcome, by a specific showing that
Congress legislated with affirmative disregard for the constitutionality
211
of the statute. This would be a difficult showing to make—it will be
the rare occasion where Congress passes a statute saying “the Constitution be damned.” But, it might come into play in an instance where
Congress legislates in specific defiance of a constitutional restriction
212
as interpreted by the Court. This leads into a discussion of two par208
209
210
211

212

See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 88–89.
See supra note 88.
There is significant debate about what materials may be legitimately consulted to ascertain congressional intent. See supra note 196. Without wading into that discussion, under
this Article’s argument, it would be a rare case where the Court should second-guess
Congress’s level of consideration of constitutionality and that very strong evidence should
be required. For a contrary argument—that Congress should say more about constitutional interpretation, and that the Court should scrutinize these statements, see Volokh,
supra note 88, at 212–222.
One example would be Congress’s attempt to override Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (Nov. 16, 1993). The Court struck
down RFRA, in part, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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ticular types of instances in which examining the background and
legislative history of the statute might be relevant to the application
of the adjustable presumption.
1. Hasty Statutes
One such instance is legislation passed quickly in a time of crisis
and perhaps without serious consideration given to its constitutionality. Two notable recent examples are enactments passed in the wake
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to respond to urgent national security concerns raised by that event: (1) the Authorization
213
for Use of Military Force, which has been cited by the government
as authority for many of the steps taken in the so-called “War on Terror” that have been the subject of significant constitutional challeng214
es, and (2) the USA PATRIOT Act , which was also passed to address
domestic issues related to national security and which has been subjected to many constitutional challenges in the courts. Critics have
charged that these enactments were passed in a panic, without due
215
consideration to their constitutionality. In the context of this Article’s arguments for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality,
these could be offered as examples of instances where the Court
should not defer more substantially to statutes passed by very large
margins because the Court should not bend the Constitution to accommodate hasty, panicked responses to crises.
One main response to this objection is simply to deny its substantive force—when Congress acts quickly and overwhelmingly to respond to an urgent national crisis, the argument for deference is at
216
its highest, not lowest. As the threat recedes and the defects in the
legislation become more apparent, public pressure will mount to

213
214
215

216

Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 124-25 (Sept. 14, 2011). Approved three days after 9/11, the
AUMF passed the House 420-1 and passed the Senate unanimously.
Pub. L. 107-56, 15 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). The Patriot Act passed the House 357-66
(84%) on Oct. 24, 2001 and passed the Senate 98-1 on Oct. 25, 2001.
E.g., Press Release, Senator Rand Paul, Senator Rand Paul’s Letter of Opposition to the
Patriot Act (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://paul.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=331164
(“Congress instead hastily passed a long-standing wish list of power grabs like warrantless
searches and roving wiretaps . . . . It is not acceptable to willfully ignore the most basic
provisions of our Constitution—in this case—the Fourth and First Amendments—in the
name of ‘security.’”).
Cf., e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
(1998) (tracing the history of incursions on civil liberty during wartime).
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change or repeal the unwise legislation.217 In addition, to the extent
that hasty statutes are challenged for infringing on individuals’ fundamental rights, such as Fourth Amendment rights, the adjustable
presumption as described in this Article would not apply, since those
challenges would be outside the modern “core” of the presumption
218
of constitutionality.
Beyond these responses, the objection should be accommodated
only by a limited adjustment in the form of allowing the presumption
to be rebutted or overcome only by a specific showing that Congress
hastily passed the legislation in affirmative disregard of its obligation
to consider constitutionality. Not much evidence would be required
to show that constitutionality was considered in passing the legislation
and, therefore, that the presumption should apply.
2. Omnibus Bills
A second specific instance in which the presumption arguably
should not apply would be when the challenged statutory provision
was passed as a small, perhaps obscure part of a much larger bill.
Here, the argument would be that when a challenged provision was
included as an afterthought or overlooked part of a much broader
bill, it cannot be said to have been specifically considered by Congress and vetted for passing constitutional muster. That is, the fact
that a provision was in a statute that passed by an overwhelming margin has very little to say about Congress’s opinion of a particular provision’s constitutionality when that provision was a small and unim219
portant part of a much larger bill.
There are several responses to this objection. First, it does not go
to the core of the argument. That is, even if some statutory challenges might fall subject to this problem, it would not go to all of them.
Some statutes, at least, are subject to significant deliberation before
their enactment and are enacted with serious consideration and de-

217

218
219

Currently, the rising and bipartisan voices of criticisms of the spying policies of American
intelligence agencies suggest that public opinion may (hopefully) be shifting towards repeal of some of the excesses of the Patriot Act and secret surveillance courts.
See supra Part III.B.
Justice Stevens leveled essentially this criticism in Salazar v. Buono, criticizing the concurrence’s suggestion that Congress’s attempt at a solution to the Mojave Cross dispute was
entitled to deference and respect because “a provision tucked silently into an appropriations bill” differs from “a major statute debated and developed over many years,” and
“[o]ne cannot infer much of anything about the land-transfer provision from the fact that
an appropriations bill passed by an overwhelming majority.” Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct.
1803, 1840, 1841 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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bate about whether they are constitutional.220 In those instances, the
arguments for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality based
on the margin of passage would still apply with full force. Second,
the Court does not generally look behind legislative votes to determine whether a particular part of a statute really was supported by
every legislator who voted for the statute. Further, the argument depends only in part on the premise that Congress must be assumed to
221
As argued
carefully consider constitutionality when it legislates.
above, the mere fact of endorsement by a very large majority should
itself prompt the Court to afford substantial deference to a statutory
222
provision.
Finally, to the extent that the objection does have force, it could
be accommodated in judicial development and application of the adjustable presumption. That is, the presumption could be perhaps rebutted by a showing that the provision under attack was added as an
afterthought or without significant deliberation by Congress. Congress, in response, could be more systematic about engaging in con223
stitutional interpretation when it legislates. Or, a provision added
by a specific amendment to a wide-ranging piece of legislation could
be examined to determine the vote margin by which that particular
amendment was added, and that could be factored into the analysis
of how strongly the court should presume that the statute is constitutional.
E. There Is No Single Margin of Passage Because of Bicameral Discrepancies
Another practical objection would be based on the observation
that statutes can, and do, pass by different margins in the two houses
of Congress, posing difficulties for a theory that adjusts the presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of statutory passage in
Congress. This raises questions about which margin should matter
more and what version of the presumption should apply when, for
example, the House passes a piece of legislation by a supermajority
and the Senate passes it by only a few votes.
There are a few responses to this objection. One is that this objection would only carry weight when the statutory margin of passage
220
221
222
223

See supra notes 88–89.
Only the argument made in Part II.B, supra, relies directly on this assumption; those in
II.A and II.C–E do not.
See supra Part II.A.
See Volokh, supra note 88, at 212–22 (discussing and suggesting improvements in the use
of constitutional authority statements as a tool to demonstrate congressional constitutional deliberation).
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differs significantly between houses and so does not defeat the core
of the argument. It would be useful to know how often there is a substantial difference in the margin of passage between the House and
Senate, and whether there are any systematic trends in the discrepan224
cy.
As for those cases in which there is a meaningful difference between the margin of passage, a few responses or accommodations
could be made. One would be simply to afford a presumption based
on the highest (or lowest) margin of passage between the two houses.
Tying the presumption to the highest margin of passage would tend
to afford more deference to federal statutes, tying it to the lowest
225
Another would be to only apply the maximum-strength verless.
sion of the presumption if both houses passed the statute by greater
than two-thirds majorities.
An alternative approach would be to privilege the margin of passage in the House over that in the Senate. The virtue of this approach would be to tie the presumption afforded to the statute to the
vote in the more democratically representative house, which would
be responsive to critics who attack the Senate as a backwards, un226
The problem would be that it would give
democratic institution.
more interpretive weight to House votes than Senate votes, which
would at least be in tension with the Constitution’s bicameralism requirements, which mostly do not distinguish between the two houses’
227
powers and abilities in passing legislation. For that reason, I would
228
not favor this approach.

224
225

226
227

228

This would be the margin measured by percentages, and not raw vote numbers.
Since this Article endorses the theory out of a preference for more deference to federal
statutes, I would favor the former approach, but it is not necessary to adopt that approach
in order to accept the basic argument.
See, e.g., LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 58.
There are exceptions, most notably the House’s sole power to originate spending bills.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. But generally, our system is not like ones those (like the
United Kingdom’s) where the more representative house has much more power to enact
legislation and the less representative house has a merely advisory role.
In addition, it may be that the Senate is actually not as unrepresentative in practice as its
theoretical critics contend. One recent study suggests, in the limited context of examining filibusters between 1991 and 2001, that at least on average the number of Senate votes
cast in favor of cloture (54.5) roughly corresponds to the share of the population
(54.9%) represented by Senators voting for cloture. See Eidelson, supra note 80, at 1004.
But see id. at 1005 (noting particular examples of filibusters where a minority thwarted the
representatives of 60% or more of the national population).
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F. An Adjustable Presumption of Constitutionality Would Never Be Applied
Because the Court Would Not Voluntarily Limit Its Own Interpretive
Supremacy
Finally, there is the simple, practical objection that even if the
theory is nice, it is essentially irrelevant because the Court is very unlikely to adopt and endorse any doctrine that tends to limit its own
powers to invalidate federal statutes. As Judge Posner points out,
229
there are no Thayerians on the Court now, and some Justices in
particular might be actively hostile to the notion of a doctrine that
230
Thus, there is
defers more to statutes passed by larger margins.
simply no chance, the argument would run, that the Court would ever choose to limit itself by increasing the amount of deference that it
affords to statutes passed by Congress, because all of the members of
the Court—despite their varying policy preferences and commitments—enjoy having the power to impose those preferences and
commitments through judicial review.
There is some truth to this objection, but also a few reasons to
think it is not fatal. One is that, as Judge Posner points out—the fall
in judicial restraint followed a rise. That is, the level of deference afforded by the Court has demonstrably altered over time, and the fact
that it has declined does not mean that it can never again rise. Current Justices might be convinced that popular views on interpreting
the Constitution—as reflected in the votes of their representatives—
should be deferred to when expressed overwhelmingly; or new Justic231
es who think so could be appointed. Even if there are no Thayerians now—that is, no Justice who defers to all statutes to that extreme
degree—it is possible that one current Justice might accept, or some
new Justice might embrace, that at the unanimous or supermajoritar229
230

231

Posner, supra note 23, at 537.
In the oral arguments in NAMUDNO v. Holder, for example, Justice Scalia took the overwhelming votes for renewing the Voting Rights Act as cause for suspicion, not deference.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No.
08-322) (“You know, the—the Israeli Supreme Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule
that if the death penalty was pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must
be something wrong there.”). In the follow-on case, Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Scalia
went even further, suggesting specifically that the unanimous Senate and near-unanimous
House votes to renew Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act should be suspect because they
reflected “a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).
Several scholars have criticized the fact that, since Justice O’Connor, the Court has had
no members who have held elected office. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 13, at 5 (“[T]he
current Supreme Court is the first in U.S. history to lack even a single member who ever
served in elected office.”); see also VERMEULE, supra note 68, at 123–25 (arguing for including non-lawyers on the federal bench).
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ian extreme, Thayerian deference could be appropriate. And, since
many, if not the most recent, controversial invalidations of federal
statutes have been accomplished by bare 5-4 majorities on the
232
Court, one Justice’s adoption of the approach could be enough to
233
change voting results.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the presumption of constitutionality
that the Supreme Court affords to federal statutes should and can be
adjusted so that it strengthens based on the margin of statutory passage. Increasing the strength of the presumption based on the margin of statutory passage ameliorates countermajoritarian concerns
about the judicial invalidation of duly enacted federal statutes in a
way that is consistent with the majoritarian justifications for the presumption of constitutionality. It draws support from the Constitution’s own privileging of supermajority enactments, as well as academic theories about supermajorities’ superior ability to enact good
laws and resolve major constitutional questions. And, it could improve judicial legitimacy both by improving judicial deference to
more popular statutes and by making explicit the Court’s widely perceived tacit consideration of the level of popular support for legislation.
This Article has also attempted to show how the presumption
could be adjusted to increase with the margin of passage, and when
the adjustable presumption should be applied. The presumption, at
the minimum, would consist of a mere tiebreaking tool, with no interpretive deference for statutes passed by razor-thin margins. It
would strengthen through a middle ground requiring a clear or plain
showing of unconstitutionality and affording some degree of interpretive flexibility. And, it would rise to a Thayerian maximum for
statutes passed by a supermajority of both houses, at which the presumption would require upholding a statute, unless it can be shown

232
233

See supra notes 124–128 (listing several of these decisions).
For example, it has been suggested that Chief Justice Roberts’s vote in Sebelius, which did
determine the result, was a switched vote and also that it was a modern-day instance of
maximal, Thayerian deference. See O’Neill, supra note 47, at 171(suggesting that Roberts’s vote was Thayerian); Jan Crawford, Roberts switched views to uphold health care law, CBS
NEWS (July 1, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/robertsswitched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law (suggesting Roberts switched); see also Caminker,
supra note 8, at 87 (“[E]ach Justice gets to decide individually how much (if any) weight
to give to the presumption of constitutionality in any given case . . . . Thus, the norm of
Thayerian deference operates by . . . Justices acting atomistically . . . .”).
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to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and include a significant degree of interpretive deference directing the Court to bend
or alter its own constitutional doctrines to accommodate the statute
under review.
Finally, this Article has attempted to show that many of the main
possible objections to the argument either are unfounded, can be accommodated by case-by-case development of the application of the
presumption, or require only limited exceptions or modifications to
the application of the adjustable presumption.
The argument opens up several areas for future inquiry. One is to
examine whether the adjustable presumption should apply even
where the Court currently weakens or reverses the presumption, such
as challenges involving enumerated or fundamental rights. Another
is to investigate empirically whether the Court in fact defers more to
statutes based on margin of statutory passage—which would support
making this tacit practice explicit by adopting an adjustable presumption. Another is to investigate the bicameralism objection—is there a
significant, systemic discrepancy in margin of passage between the
House and Senate, and if so, which margin should weigh more in determining how strong the presumption of constitutionality should be?
Finally, further research could investigate whether the arguments for
applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality to federal
statutes also apply to state statutes, or for deferring more to executive
actions of more popular presidents.

